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MUST GOD BE DEAD OR IRRELEVANT:  DRAWING A CIRCLETHAT LETS ME IN
Richard M. Esenberg*
ABSTRACT
Some scholars claim that current Establishment Clause doctrine can increasinglybe explained in terms of substantive neutrality—that is, the idea that governmentought to treat religion and irreligion (or comparable secular activities) in the sameway.  Whether a product of the Court’s commitment to the idea or an artifact of thepositions of the “swing” Justices, this proposition has considerable explanatory power.The Supreme Court has, in recent years, permitted the government to make financialsupport equally available for religious uses, as long as it is done on a neutral basis andthrough the private choice of the recipients.  It has required the government, in itssuperintendence of general and limited purpose public forums, to treat comparablereligious and secular speakers identically.But the Court has continued to insist upon a substantial degree of secularity withrespect to government speech.  Some have argued that this is consistent with substan-tive neutrality as well.  Government has but one voice and, while money and facilitiescan be made available in a way that respects individual choice, prayers and messagesconcerning religion cannot.  Substantive neutrality, the argument continues, requiresgovernment silence on religious matters.The problem is that modern government is not—and probably cannot be—silenton such matters.  In addition, current doctrine is ambitious.  It seeks to prevent evenvery subtle injury to dissidents.  As a consequence, it cannot protect religious objectorsto secular speech with religious implication in the same way it seeks to protect evensecular objectors from even the most bland of religious speech.I argue that this asymmetry is not substantively neutral.  Drawing, in part, on theinsights of post-liberal theology, I suggest that it permits the precise expressive harmthat Establishment Clause doctrine claims to seek to prevent—that is, permits religiousdissidents to feel they are disfavored members of the political community and allowsthe state to influence religious formation.  Drawing on theories regarding the value ofmediating institutions, including the Catholic notion of subsidiarity and the Calvinistidea of sphere sovereignty, I maintain that this asymmetry is undesirable and offer aless ambitious paradigm.  Because we cannot protect the religious and secular fromsubtle expressive injury in the same way, we ought not to try.
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129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009).1 Id. at 1134.2
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PRELUDE
This past term in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,  the Supreme Court once again1affirmed the “government speech doctrine”—the idea that the First Amendment’s FreeSpeech Clause applies to government regulation of private speech, and not speechby the government itself.   Applying the doctrine, the Court held that a municipal2display of a privately donated Ten Commandments monument in a public park was
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Id. at 1138.3 Some public spaces such as streets, parks, and civic plazas that, by tradition and custom,4have been devoted to public assembly and debate have come to be regarded as traditionalpublic forums. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). In such places, a speaker may beexcluded only if it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and that exclusion mustbe narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,112 (2001). Even public places not traditionally recognized for public assembly and debatemay become so by government policy. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460U.S. 37, 45 (1983). A limited purpose public forum is created when the government designatesa forum for use by certain speakers or for the discussion of certain subjects. Rosenberger v.Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). In these circumstances, anentire class of speakers or entire subjects may be excluded through the application of reasonablerestrictions on the content of the speech allowed. Id. But, crucially, those restrictions mustbe viewpoint neutral. Id.Summum is a religious organization grounded in elements of Gnostic Christianity. It5claims that its Seven Aphorisms were inscribed on the original tablets handed down by Godto Moses on Mount Sinai, but shared with only a select group of people. Today they can befound on the church’s website, if not in Pleasant Grove City. Seven Summum Principles,http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).Summum , 129 S.Ct. at 1129.6 Id. at 1136.7 Id. at 1131.8 Id. at 1139.9 See infra Part I. D.10
government speech  and not private speech within a traditional or limited purpose3public forum.   The city, therefore, was under no obligation to accept and display a4monument setting forth the Seven Aphorisms of Summum.   The Court rejected the5argument that the city was required to expressly endorse the message of the displayin order for it to qualify as government speech.   It recognized, in fact, that at least in6the context of a public monument, government speech can be perceived to conveya number of messages and the government cannot be presumed to have endorsed anyparticular one.   If the state were forced to acknowledge and convey all messages7that compete with, or are complementary with these potential meanings, this wouldsubstantially impair its ability to function.8Although the Court recognized that government speech is subject to the Establish-ment Clause, the question of whether the Ten Commandments display was itself uncon-stitutional was not raised and, therefore, not decided.   Summum, then, does not itself9alter our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  But that jurisprudence, as it relates togovernment speech, relies heavily on judicial divination of the message that suchspeech “is” perceived to have “endorsed.”   Nevertheless, Summum’s recognition that10government speech may convey a number of messages, and that evenhandedness inthat speech is impractical, suggests further clarification of just when and how govern-ment speech is limited by the Establishment Clause.  In my view, not merely clarifi-cation, but a thorough re-thinking—is just what is required.
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Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to Play: Toward a More11Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAM S U. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2006).403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1999) (stating that state action must (1) “have a secular legis-12lative purpose;” (2) have a “primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion;”and (3) does not “foster ‘an excessive entanglement with religion’”).Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding13that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
INTRODUCTION
In an earlier article, I told the story of Dick and Jane.
Dick is an atheist.  He may be exposed to such things as vol-untary prayer or a sticker on his textbook that identifies randomevolution as a theory and informs him that some people argue infavor of an alternative theory called Intelligent Design.  He is notcoerced to believe or proclaim anything.  He is not told that hisideas are wrong or untrue.  He may feel left out.  He may feel pres-sure to go along and affirm what many of his classmates affirm.
Jane is an evangelical Christian.  She believes that God createdthe world and all living things in it, but is taught that life aroseas a result of random chemical processes.  She believes that pre-marital sex and homosexuality are sins, prohibited by God.  Sheis taught that gays and lesbians are exercising their individualrights and are to be, if not celebrated, accepted.  She is taught thatthe decision to engage in pre-marital sex is hers alone and, while(perhaps) inadvisable, is a decision that can be made on the basisof considerations other than her religion, each of which she is in-vited to explore.  She is consistently reminded that she is different.She feels strong pressure to conform.
The harm, if that is what it is, suffered by Dick and Jane is similar.Both may feel excluded on the basis of their religious views.  Bothare reminded that a majority of their classmates—and the schoolwhich each attends—embrace a different set of beliefs.  Both aresubject to school and peer pressure to alter their own beliefs.  Butit is a generally accepted view that only Dick has an EstablishmentClause remedy.11
Dick (or his parents) will certainly be able to enjoin the religious messages thatoffend him, either because they violate the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,  or12constitute a government endorsement of religion.   The court would likely observe13
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questions of religious belief or from “making adherence to religion relevant in any way toa person’s standing in the political community”).Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) (holding that school may not sponsor prayer14at graduation ceremony).Id. at 593.15 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.16 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.17 Courts have repeatedly held that parents have no right to object to the provision of18secular information that is inconsistent with their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Fields v. PalmdaleSch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005) (challenging school survey containing sexualmatter); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (objecting to mandatoryhealth education course); Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of PhiladelphiaBd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 1998) (objecting to condoms being distributed inpublic schools); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995)(objecting to attendance at AIDS awareness assembly).Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 106 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008).19 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).20 See infra Part III.C.21
that “the preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a respon-sibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which itself is promised free-dom to pursue that mission.”   It would probably say, that even though Dick was not14required to affirm anything, “given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter inthis milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation orapproval of it.”   Dick could reasonably conclude that the school has endorsed a15position on religion other than his own and, the court would conclude, that is consti-tutionally impermissible.  This is because constitutional doctrine has developed ina way that seeks to prevent government from neither “advanc[ing] nor inhibit[ing]religion,”  or causing him to feel like an “outsider[], not [a] full member[] of the16political community.”17But the principles that protect Dick are of little help to Jane.  Communications thatare inimical to her religious beliefs, but are not themselves expressed in “theological”or “religious” language, are likely to be regarded as constitutionally permissible.18A court would almost certainly say that “[p]ublic schools are not obliged to shieldindividual students from ideas which potentially are religiously offensive.”19It might cite the observation of Justice Anthony Kennedy that, while “studentsmay consider it an odd measure of justice to be subjected during the course of theireducations to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief, formalprayer ceremony,” this “odd measure” of justice is precisely what the EstablishmentClause requires.20Dick has been subjected to explicitly, if bland, religious language concerning,however broadly, extratemporal matters.  The messages to which Jane objects havebeen couched in “secular” language. While one might distinguish a prayer or explicittheological claims from the expression, or approval, of a position that contradicts adissenter’s religious beliefs, it is not clear that this distinction matters to the dissenter.21
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Dissenting in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Scalia questioned what he saw as the majority’s22assumption that religion is “some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely insecret . . . in the privacy of one’s room. For most believers it is not that, and has never been.”505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivismand Federalism, 2003 CHI. L. REV. 669, 676 (“[S]eparationism is neutral only within a set ofassumptions in respect to human nature and religion that many people do not share.”).See infra Part II. B. 1.23 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U.24L. REV. 146, 162 (1986).See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51,2570–72 (2007).See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional26Secularism , 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1017.See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing27Something, 70 FORDHAM  L. REV. 1147, 1195–96 (2002).See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 9028CORNELL L. REV. 9, 78 (2004) (stating that the government could not function if it could notvitiate religious views).Naomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation,29Indoctrination and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1993).827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).30
The notion that faith can be cabined into a private sphere largely concerned withmetaphysical assertions is itself a claim about what religion is or should be.   It does22not comport with the best scholarship about how religious beliefs form, evolve andare transmitted.   Whatever harm might be caused by the government’s participa-23tion in the preservation and transmission of religious beliefs seems to be the samewhether that participation comes in the form of a bland non-denominational prayeror the contradiction of a core belief.Recognition of the asymmetry with which plaintiffs like Dick and Jane aretreated is not new,  but a resolution has proven to be elusive.  Some have attempted24to justify —and even celebrate —the idea of asymmetry, while others have argued25 26that modification of doctrine—or sage policy—could alleviate the imbalance.   Still27others have said that it is simply the best we can do.28In a seminal article,  Professor Naomi Maya Stolzenberg discussed the problem29in the context of Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,  in which a group30of conservative Christians sought unsuccessfully to have their children excused fromcertain readings that they found offensive to and contradictory to their religiousbeliefs.  The title of the article draws upon a concurrence by Judge Boggs, whileholding that the parents and their children had no constitutional right to be excused,nevertheless expressed the difficulty of the case by quoting a portion of a poem byEdward Markham:
He drew a circle that shut me out—Heretic, Rebel, a thing to flout.
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Stolzenberg, supra note 29, at 584–85 (quoting Edwin Markham, Outwitted, in THE31BEST LOVED POEMS OF THE AM ERICAN PEOPLE 37 (Hazel Felleman ed., 1936)).Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1074.32 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.33 See infra Part III. B.34
But Love and I had the wit to win:We drew a circle that took him in!31
In Judge Boggs’s view, the school board should have found a way to take thechildren in, even if the Constitution did not compel it.   As we will see, the Mozert32plaintiffs did not raise the issue of Establishment Clause asymmetry.   They, and33most litigants bringing similar challenges in the intervening years, have sought onlyto be excused from objectionable activities, relying more frequently on Free Exercisethan Establishment arguments.  Nevertheless, Judge Boggs’s twenty-year-old regretthat a circle was not drawn to let in religious objectors to an ostensibly “secular”government message remains unaddressed.The purpose of this article is to challenge the asymmetrical treatment of Dick andJane.  My point is not that schools and public spaces can be made completely accept-able to all manner of believers and non-believers, or that the sentiments of the Janesof the world ought to be the measure of what can and cannot be said in public schoolclassrooms.  Just as one school may have been entitled to solemnize a graduationceremony with a prayer, another school may have a legitimate interest in communicat-ing a message about tolerance of those with differing sexual orientations.  We oughthowever, to seek to treat those who claim to be harmed by each proposal equally, anda jurisprudence that seeks to protect dissenters from relatively slight injuries cannotmanage this.I want to explore a new paradigm.  One that seeks not a hopeless attempt to holddissenters harmless, but to promote tolerance of, and room for, dissenting religious be-liefs.  It draws on theological and sociological insights into the nature of religion andits interaction with the larger society to argue that the harms suffered by those in theposition of Jane do not differ materially from those suffered by Dick.  It borrows fromtheories emphasizing the vital importance of a mediating institution, including churchesand religious organizations, to demonstrate why this asymmetry is undesirable.Although some scholars have argued that respect for the independence of medi-ating institutions supports Establishment Clause asymmetry,  I believe that, in light34of the role in our lives played by the contemporary state, the picture is more compli-cated.  If the state seeks to address matters with which religion is concerned (and itwill), then it ought to have more room to facilitate the inclusion of religious perspec-tives.  Everyone cannot be equally comfortable within the circle, but comfort ought notto be a function of one’s willingness to accept public secularity and private religion.Part I considers the current state of the law, and Part II demonstrates its asymmet-rical treatment of government speech about religion.  Part III argues that this asymmetry
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Esenberg, supra note 11, at 24.35 330 U.S. 1 (1947).36 Id. at 8; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (holding the37religion clause applicable to the states in the context of free exercise claim).See, e.g., Jonathan Mills, Strict Separationism’s Sacred Canopy, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 397,38421 (1994) (“In formal argumentation though not in practice (for it did not invalidate NewJersey legislation that provided transportation at public expense for Roman Catholic schools),Everson is the founding strict separationism decision . . . .”); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Deathof Separationism , 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 233–34 (1994) (noting that the “dominant eraof separationism” began in 1947 with the Court’s Everson decision). Lupu states that “Eversonis best and most importantly remembered for its broad separationist dicta and for the Court’sunanimous adoption of the Virginia history of religious liberty as the key to the meaning of theFirst Amendment’s Establishment Clause.” Id. He further states that “[t]his historical account,which placed James Madison and his justly famed (and staunchly separationist) Memorial andRemonstrance Against Religious Assessments at the heart of the meaning of the EstablishmentClause, became the ‘official’ history of the clause until challenged by scholars and justices inthe early 1980s.” Id.Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.39
interferes with individual liberty, is inconsistent with the notion of substantive neutral-ity that seems to inform, however fitfully, much of our Establishment Clause juris-prudence, and encroaches upon spheres of life with which religion is concerned.  Ourjurisprudence fails, therefore, on its own terms.  Part IV sets forth a new paradigm foran asymmetrical Establishment Clause, rooted in a principle of nonestablishment.
I. AN AMBITIOUS NEUTRALITY
I have argued elsewhere that this asymmetry is born of ambition.   It arises from35an effort to ensure that government do nothing to promote either religion or irreli-gion and that it not act in a way that might make nonadherents uncomfortable.  Butseeking an evenhandedness that cannot be achieved requires that we fudge our insis-tence on neutrality, and, with respect to government speech, we fudge it in favor ofa public secularity that makes religious dissenters just as uncomfortable as publicreligiosity would make nonadherents.
A. The Roots of Neutrality
Before assessing the problem, it is helpful to briefly trace its origin.  The modernera’s emphasis on neutrality of Establishment Clause jurisprudence began in Eversonv. Board of Education,  holding that the prohibition against laws “respecting an36establishment of religion” was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and isapplicable to the states.  Although Everson is traditionally associated with a rigorously37separationist view of disestablishment,  the Court actually upheld the reimbursement38of the parents of parochial school children for money spent on transportation to andfrom school.   Everson is best known, however, not for its result, but for its rhetoric.39
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Id. at 8–10.40 Id. at 13–14.41 Id. at 8–9.42 Id. at 9.43 Id. at 10–11.44 Id. at 11–12 (citing the arguments of Madison and Jefferson).45 See, e.g., Carlton Morse, A Political Process Theory of Judicial Review Under the46Religion Clauses, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 807–08 (2007).Id. at 808.47
Justice Black’s first move was to emphasize religion as something uniquelyinflammatory and potentially corrupting.   Writing for the majority, Justice Black40argued that disestablishment was rooted in the uniquely divisive nature of religionas well as the special importance of religious liberty.   He pointed to early colonial41settlers fleeing a Europe “filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generatedin large part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political andreligious supremacy.”   “In efforts to force loyalty,” he wrote “to whatever religious42group happened to be on top and in league with the government of a particular timeand place, men and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed.”43Justice Black also pointed to colonial impositions on religious liberty—Catholics“hounded and proscribed,” Quakers sent “to jail”—that “shock[ed] the freedom-lovingcolonials into a feeling of abhorrence.”   This prompted the framers to eschew a44national establishment.It would be a mistake, however, to attribute Justice Black’s concern over thedangers of religion to anti-clericalism or a hostility to religion.  Religion may be dan-gerous, in his view, because its adherents regard it as fundamental to their identity andessential to life in this world and beyond.  This is presumably behind both the temp-tation to abuse and the integral value of religious freedom.45But, although he found disestablishment to be rooted in an abhorrence of coer-cive practices and direct establishments, Justice Black’s second move was to read themandate of nonestablishment as reaching well beyond these evils that prompted itsenactment.   If religion is especially divisive or a strong temptation for the abuse46of power, coercion or the creation of a state church may not be the only evil to beavoided.   If religious freedom is a special form of liberty, then the state may im-47peril it in other ways:
Not only, in his view, can the government not establish a church,it cannot “aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religionover another” and “[n]either a state nor the Federal Governmentcan openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religiousorganizations or groups and vice versa.”  Not only may it not par-ticipate in coercive practices, it ought not to “force nor influence
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Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16 (internal citations omitted).48 JAM ES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 249WRITINGS OF JAM ES MADISON 183, 186 (G. Hunt ed., 1901).Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.50 Id. at 11.51 Id. at 18.52 Id.53 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).54 Judge Michael McConnell has argued that Engel is the first case to clearly abandon55coercion as an element of establishment. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Elementof Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 934–35 (1987); see, e.g., Cantwell v.
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his willor force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”48
In Everson, Justice Black suggested that the best policy might be separation.Echoing James Madison’s famous demand that not “three pence” be taxed to supportreligion,  Justice Black wrote that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be49levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”50The principle of disestablishment, in his view, reflected “the conviction that indi-vidual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was strippedof all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interferewith the beliefs of any religious individual or group.”   Thus his ringing conclusion51that “[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.  That wallmust be kept high and impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest breach.”52This wall of separation has never been as high or steadfast as Justice Black’s lan-guage might suggest.  From the beginning (as Everson’s result suggests), there hasbeen a counter-theme, suggesting that, if religious liberty is an important objective,separation may not always advance it.  Thus began a theme of neutrality between reli-gion and irreligion—a formulation that has been repeated over the intervening de-cades.  It is conceivable that separation might mean a state promotion of secularitybut disestablishment in America has never meant that.In Everson itself, for example, Justice Black observed that the First Amendment“requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believersand non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary:  State power isno more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”   Neverthe-53less, after Everson, the avoidance of establishment has been understood to requiremore than the absence of coercion or an established church.  But it is also understoodto require a neutrality between religion and irreligion.The ambition of Everson was extended to government speech in Engel v. Vitale.54The Court, perhaps for the first time, found a practice that was clearly not coercive,at least in the traditional sense, to violate the Establishment Clause.   A school district55
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Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (finding that the Establishment Clause “forestallscompulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship”).Engel, 370 U.S. at 422.56 Id. at 430.57 Id. at 424.58 Justice Black focused, in particular, on controversies in England around the content of59the Book of Common Prayer, which was, of course, a dispute over what the state would requirein religious services conducted by a national church. Id. at 425–29.Id. at 430–31.60 Id. at 432.61 374 U.S. 203 (1963).62
in New Hyde Park, New York, acting upon the recommendation of the State Boardof Regents, adopted a policy requiring teachers to begin each school day by recitinga brief prayer:  “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and webeg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.”   No student56was required to recite the prayer.57In finding recitation of the prayer “wholly inconsistent with the EstablishmentClause,”  Justice Black once again found that the purpose of nonestablishment was58rooted in reaction to coercive and exclusionary practices materially different in degreeand kind from the Regents’ prayer.   He again made clear, however, that such prac-59tices did not define the reach of the constitutional command:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, doesnot depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsionand is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an offi-cial religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not.  This is not to say, of course, thatlaws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worshipdo not involve coercion of such individuals.  When the power,prestige and financial support of government is placed behind aparticular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon reli-gious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approvedreligion is plain.  But the purposes underlying the EstablishmentClause go much further than that.60
Engel further advanced the notion of nonestablishment as strict separation, butit also continued to root separation in, not only the avoidance of division, but theservice of religious liberty, emphasizing the division that stemmed from historic(coercive) practices and seeing nonestablishment as reflecting the principle that“religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’by a civil magistrate.”61The next term, in Abington School District v. Schempp,  the Court found uncon-62stitutional a requirement for the daily reading of scripture passages and recitation of
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Id. at 205–06.63 Id. at 205.64 Id. at 222–23.65 Id. at 222.66 Id.67 Id. at 306.68
the Lord’s Prayer.   Although students could be excused,  the Court once again made63 64clear that the establishment prohibition, unlike the guarantee of free exercise, neednot involve coercion.
The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here,withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertionof any restraint on the free exercise of religion.  Its purpose is to se-cure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasionsthereof by civil authority.  Hence it is necessary in a free exercisecase for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it oper-ates against him in the practice of his religion.  The distinction be-tween the two clauses is apparent—a violation of the Free ExerciseClause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clauseviolation need not be so attended.65
Nonestablishment, in the view of the Abington majority, required a separation groundedin neutrality.  It requires that government action have “a secular legislative purposeand a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”66Justice Clark, writing for the Court, emphasized that nonestablishment placed thestate in a position of “wholesome ‘neutrality’” regarding religion such that every personmight “freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsionfrom the state.”67Separation was again thought to serve that end.  But our counterpoint remainedpresent.  Justice Goldberg, concurring, warned that:
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to in-vocation or approval of results which partake not simply of thatnoninterference and noninvolvement with the religious whichthe Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devo-tion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the reli-gious.  Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution,but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it.68
What is significant for our purposes is that Everson and Engel reflect a turn away fromreading the Establishment Clause to bar only classic establishments and coercive orpunitive government practices.  More specifically, Everson and, in particular, Engel
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Rosen, supra note 22, at 707 (citing Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the69Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 148–49 (1992)). Professor Rosen reminds us that any suchbaseline is “nonaxiomatic and contestable.” Id. There is no objective “view from nowhere.”Id. (borrowing the phrase from THOM AS NAGEL, THE VIEW  FROM  NOW HERE 6 (1986)).Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 WM. & MARY L.70REV. 2193, 2196–98 (2008); see also Esenberg, supra note 11, at 11, 14, 18 (describing a sepa-rationist, accommodationist, and “ambitious” Establishment Clause, with the latter rooted ina concept of endorsement neutrality).Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2196.71 Id.72 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for73our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates government neutrality betweenreligion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))).See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (concluding that religion is a74“product of free and voluntary choice”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972)(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that “[r]eligion is an individual experience”); Eversonv. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting that James Madisonconsidered religion to be “wholly private”).See, e.g., note 37 and cases cited therein; see also Lee v. Weissman, 505 U.S. 577 (1993);75Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist.of Abington, Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
began a doctrinal quest for a neutrality that could serve religious liberty and equalityand completely ban the heavy hand of the state from its citizens’ religious lives.
B. The Imperative of Neutrality
But, in and of itself, neutrality makes sense only in light of ground rules—that is,some sense of that state of affairs with respect to which we must be neutral.   Does69the absence of religion constitute a neutrality that is disturbed by its inclusion?  Ordoes neutrality require its inclusion?  We need a theory of how things should be.  Thatthis reference point is not readily identified is suggested by the point and counter-pointof avoiding, on the one hand, establishment of religion and, on the other, its inhibition.Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that there are three competing conceptions ofnonestablishment among the Justices.   Each represents a different conception of neu-70trality.  One view is strictly separationist, committed to a relatively robust quarantineof religion from the precincts of government.   The state—all that it does and all that71it pays for—should be secular.   This may be expressed in terms of neutrality,  but72 73it is a neutrality predicated upon a certain view of religion.  If you believe that reli-gion is private and can be separated from all or most of what concerns the modernstate, then evenhandedness and equality may well be served by exclusion.   For sepa-74rationist judges and scholars, the baseline for assessing neutrality is secular.  No men-tion of religion, or funding to individuals for religious purposes, or use of facilitiesby religious groups is neutral because all religious groups are excluded.  There arecertainly cases in which that type of neutrality seems to have prevailed.   In practice75
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Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2197–98.76 Id.77 Even Justice Scalia, for example, argued that the state may not endorse any particular78form of monotheism. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 893–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that there was no basis in the Constitution’s79text, nor in our society’s historic or current understanding of the words, for the majority’sconclusion that “manifesting a purpose to favor adherence to religion generally is unconsti-tutional” (citations omitted). Id. at 889; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687(2005) (plurality opinion) (recognizing “the role of God in our Nation’s heritage”); Lee v.Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting with approval JusticeKennedy’s partial dissent in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989), in whichhe recognized that the Establishment Clause must be construed in light of the “[g]overnmentpolicies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an acceptedpart of our political and cultural heritage”).See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that80the majority opinion had the effect of approving a program that socially discriminated againstreligion, and that such approval was inconsistent with the court’s prior decisions mandatingneutrality); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that tests measuring81only neutrality could lead to hostility against religion).See id.82 Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2197.83 Id. at 2197, 2209.84
(if not in rhetoric), this view does not emphasize neutrality between religion andirreligion because it is less likely to see them in conflict.Another view is accommodationist.   Although Dean Chemerinsky describes76this view as holding that the Establishment Clause can only be violated by the literalestablishment of a church or the coercion of religious participation,  it is unclear that77any Justice has ever taken such an extreme view.   What is key is that judicial and78academic accommodationists believe that nonestablishment leaves room for somesubstantial facilitation and acknowledgment of religion by the state.   Once again,79accommodationists may also speak in terms of neutrality,  but it is a neutrality that80emphasizes the value of religion in civil society.  When accommodationists are morelikely to have in mind an evenhandedness among religions, rather than between reli-gion and irreligion.   The baseline for determining governmental neutrality is some-81thing like our historic regard and acknowledgment of either a generic monotheism orthe Judeo-Christian tradition.   For accommodationists, de-emphasis of neutrality82between religion and irreligion does not stem from a failure to see them in conflictas much as it does from the view that evenhandedness between them, (as opposed toamong religions) is not required.A third view also argues in terms of governmental neutrality toward religion.83In fact, Dean Chemerinsky calls it the “neutrality” approach  probably because, with84some justification, he believes that the other two approaches are not neutral at all.  Onthis view, government must remain neutral among religions and between religion and
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Id. at 2197.85 See supra notes 38–39.86 Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious87Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).Id.88 For example, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined89with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to uphold vouchers for use insectarian schools. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Dean Chemerinsky sees the Court’s tangled decisionin County of Allegheny v. ACLU, as reflecting the way in which “neutralist” Justices O’Connorand Blackmun saw the differing expressive nature of a nativity scene and a menorah. 492 U.S.573 (1989) (finding a Christmas nativity display unconstitutional while permitting a largeChanukah menorah to be displayed). The former, in their view, sent a message of religiousendorsement while the latter did not. Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2198–2200.Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).90
irreligion.   This form of neutrality recognizes the dangers warned of in the counter-85theme we found in Everson and Engel and related cases.   There are circumstances86in which separation is not neutral.  Borrowing from Douglas Laycock,  I want to87refine Dean Chemerinsky’s taxonomy by calling this view substantive neutrality,meaning the imperative that the state act in a way which, insofar as it is possible, en-sures each person might freely choose his or her religious course free of governmentinterference.   To achieve this, the state must often treat religious activities as it treats88comparable secular activities in order to maintain evenhandedness, but it must avoidendorsing any particular religion or religion (or secularism) in general.It is unclear that any of these three views (which are, of course, held to differingdegrees and applied differently even by Justices identified with one “camp”) currentlycommands a majority on the Court.  Most recently, the Justices emphasizing substan-tive neutrality have, depending on the case, joined with the Justices more committedto separation or accommodation to form a majority.89
C. The Triumph of Substantive Neutrality
In cases involving public funding of private activities and private access to publicfacilities, the result has been the functional triumph of substantive neutrality—the ideathat government treats religious activities in the same way it treats comparable secularactivities.  This avoids tilting the influence of public funding or the use of publicfacility toward any particular religion or toward religion or irreligion in general.
1. Public Funding
The Court has shown a broad willingness to permit government funding of faithbased services as long as the choice of those alternatives was made by an individualand there remains a private secular alternative.  It has upheld tax deductions for ex-penses connected with sending children to private schools, including religious ones,90
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Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).91 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).92 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1987).93 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).94 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).95 536 U.S. 639 (2002).96 Id. at 662–63. Evenhandedness between religious and secular uses of neutrally avail-97able funds may not, however, be required. In Locke v. Davey, the Court held that the state ofWashington could refuse to permit the use of a generally available scholarship program tofund preparation for the ministry without violating a student’s free exercise rights. 540 U.S.712 (2004). Some scholars have argued that Locke permits, but does not require, state discrim-ination in favor of a secular state. See, e.g., Richard S. Myers, The Privatization of Religionand Catholic Justices, 47 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 157, 161 (2008) (stating that neutrality is a matterof “legislative grace”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Davey and the Limits of Equality, 40 TULSAL. REV. 267, 268, 272 (2004). Locke may also represent the Court’s aversion to the argumentthat the government might be required to fund religious activities. See Frederick Mark Gedicks,The Establishment Clause Gag Reflex, 2004 BYU L. REV. 995, 1001.Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.98
educational grants to be used at sectarian colleges,  sign language interpreters to be91used by a student at a sectarian school,  grants to religiously affiliated organizations92for sexuality and pregnancy counseling,  funding for remedial education in religious93schools,  and direct aid for instructional materials to pervasively sectarian schools.94 95In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris  the Court upheld Ohio’s school voucher plan96permitting families in Cleveland to receive tuition aid for both secular and sectarianprivate schools.  Because the program had the valid secular purpose of providing edu-cational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system,and provided assistance directly to citizens who themselves directed the aid to reli-gious schools, the program did not violate the Establishment Clause.   Writing for97a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect toreligion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citi-zens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schoolswholly as a result of their own genuine and independent privatechoice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under theEstablishment Clause.98
This movement seeks substantive neutrality, at least with respect to what theConstitution permits the government to do.  If the state is, for example, going tofinance public education or other services, then substantive neutrality is served bymaking similar resources available for comparable parochial education and servicesprovided by religious organizations.
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Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).99 Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).100 Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).101 See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94102(1993).515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995).103 See id. at 845–46.104 See id.105 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001).106 See id. at 108–112 (“Milford’s exclusion of the club from use of the school, pursuant107to its community use policy, constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.”).
2. “Private” Speech in Public Places
The Court has also permitted substantial private religious expression in placesor fora that the government funds or controls.  For example, the Court has held thatstudent religious groups were entitled to equal access to university facilities, generallyavailable to other student groups,  and upheld that the Federal Equal Access Act,99guaranteeing student religious groups access to school facilities made generally avail-able to other extracurricular groups during noninstructional time.   It has held that the100state must permit a cross on a state-owned plaza that was a traditional public forum,open generally to private speech,  and ruled similarly in cases involving more limited101public fora, holding that public school facilities made available to the public duringnonschool hours must be made available to a church group that wished to show a filmon child rearing.102The key move, however, was made in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of theUniversity of Virginia; the Court held that the University of Virginia could not denyfunding to a religious group seeking to publish a Christian magazine where fundingfor this purpose was made available to other student groups.   Notwithstanding the103pervasively religious content of the publication, the majority held that this consti-tuted nothing more than a particular perspective toward which the state, having chosento fund private speech, was required to be neutral.   Once again, the Court declined104to regard a state mandated secularity as religiously neutral and rejected the notionthat a neutral program of funding private religious speech in public spaces is imper-missibly divisive.105Rosenberger was extended in Good News Club v. Milford Central School.106The Court held that a school which allowed after-school use of its building by anygroup promoting the moral and character development of children could not denyuse to a Christian club that wished to use the space for Bible study, prayer, and moralinstruction.   Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas was untroubled by Justice107Souter’s suggestion that the program involved worship, observing that it still con-stituted moral instruction, and rejected the suggestion that “reliance on Christianprinciples taints moral and character instruction in a way that other foundations for
18 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1
Id. at 111.108 As noted at the outset, government speech does not create a public forum and thus109does not create an obligation to communicate or permit other views. See Pleasant Grove Cityv. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).Laycock, supra note 25, at 71.110 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invoking Lemon).111 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (declining to apply Lemon yet decided the same112day as McCreary).403 U.S. 602 (1971).113 Id. at 612–13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).114 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).115 Id. at 72. (“[M]oney can be delivered in a way that is consistent with individual choice.116Prayers cannot. Neither can scripture, creeds, Christmas displays, or any other speech promot-ing or denigrating religion.”).
thought or viewpoints do not.”   Once again, neutrality was thought to require108inclusion of religious uses in a forum made available on a neutral basis.109Professor Laycock sees Zelman as substantively neutral.  It “creates no incentivesto choose religious or secular education” and “protects individual choice; each familycan choose for itself which school to attend.”110The quest for substantive neutrality is expressed in the Court’s on-again,  off-111again,  test of nonestablishment, first announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman,  requir-112 113ing that a government action:  “First . . . must have a secular legislative purpose;second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibitsreligion; finally, the [action] must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglementwith religion.’”   It is, as we will see, reflected in former Justice O’Connor’s view114that religious expression by the state is forbidden when its purpose or effect is to en-dorse religion or nonreligion, or one religion over another.  Endorsement, in herview, “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members ofthe political community.”115D. Government Speech:  Substantive Neutrality Becomes Endorsement Neutrality
But, in the realm of government speech, substantive neutrality cannot mean stateevenhandedness between private choices.  The government often has only one voice(or, in some circumstances, a relatively limited number of voices).  There are only somany monuments and village hall displays that can be erected.  Only so many invoca-tions can be offered at graduation.  While funding and forums may be neutrally avail-able to all religious and secular comers, the government often wishes to express adistinctive point of view and, when the government itself is speaking, that messagewill bear its imprimatur.   Because, in most circumstances in which the government116speaks, everyone cannot be accommodated, the argument goes, we ought to expectreligious expression to be off-limits.  In the case of government speech, substantiveneutrality requires separation.  The state, if it can, and, as we shall see, it cannot, oughtsay nothing at all on religious matters.
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Government may, under certain circumstances, communicate “objectively” about reli-117gion, although the legal rigor required to do so may often operate as a disincentive to eventry. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.See supra note 58 and accompanying text.118 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (finding that an Alabama law119that “authorized a period of silence ‘for meditation or voluntary prayer’” violated the FirstAmendment).Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).120 See 393 U.S. 97, 107–09 (1968).121 See 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).122 505 U.S. 577 (1992).123 Id. at 591.124 Id. at 593.125
So, while the Court has allowed significant interaction between religion and gov-ernment in the areas of public aid and private speech in certain public fora, governmentspeech must remain relatively religion-free.   The Court has banned and compelled117voluntary prayer in school settings.   It has struck down laws calling for a moment118of silence when persuaded of its religious provenance  and the Court invalidated a119state requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted in public classrooms.120In Epperson v. Arkansas, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting the teach-ing of evolution because the prohibition was based upon certain religious views andthus violated the constitutional mandate of neutrality.   In Edwards v. Aguillard,121the Court struck down a law requiring schools to teach “creation science” as well asevolutionary theory where it found the mandate to be religiously motivated.122Religious discourse is excluded from the public sphere not only when the govern-ment is the speaker, but when it sponsors—or a reasonable observer might concludethat it has sponsored—religious speech.  If government permits religious speech in acontext where it exercises control over the message or otherwise facilitates “religiousexpression” in a way that may be characterized as granting its imprimatur, courts mayconclude that it is government sponsored and, therefore, prohibited.In Lee v. Weisman,  the Court held that a school could not provide for nonsec-123tarian prayer by a clergyperson at a graduation ceremony.  The prayers—an invocationand benediction—were a brief nonparticipatory statement of a generic monotheismimplying no more than that there is a God whose care can be invoked.  Writing forthe majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy allowed that “students may consider it anodd measure of justice to be subjected during the course of their educations to ideasdeemed offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief, formal prayer ceremony thatthe school offers in return,” yet Kennedy was himself untroubled.   The Court noted124that “for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation, the act of standing or re-maining silent was an expression of participation in the [R]abbi’s prayer.”   In the125view of the majority, the “perseveration and transmission of religious beliefs andworship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which itself
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Id. at 589.126 Id. at 593. In his dissent, Justice Scalia observed that while we live in “a vulgar age,”127our social conventions “have not coarsened to the point that anyone who does not stand onhis chair and shout obscenities can reasonably be deemed to have assented to everything saidin his presence.” Id. at 637.530 U.S. 290, 306–07, 313 (2000) (“[T]he religious liberty protected by the Constitution128is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.”).Id. at 627 (O’Connor J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)).129 Some courts have seen the endorsement test as a refinement of the first two prongs in130Lemon (i.e., “purpose” and “effect”), see for example Ind. Civ. Liberties Union v. O’Bannon,259 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1162 (2002) (calling the focus onthe first two prongs of the Lemon test the “endorsement test”), while others have consideredit to be a refinement of the effects prong. See, e.g., ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 503(6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1152 (2005) (“[I]n evaluating the ‘effects’ prong ofthe Lemon test, I apply the ‘endorsement test.’”).Thomas Berg has argued that, although the nonendorsement principle may be appropriate131for government speech cases, it is not appropriate as a general requirement of the EstablishmentClause. See Thomas Berg, What’s Right and Wrong with “No Endorsement,” 21 WASH. U.J. L. & POL’Y 307, 308 (2006).See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 25, at 70 (suggesting that with respect to the Establishment132Clause, substantive neutrality and the protection of individual religious choice can explainvotes of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor).
is promised freedom to pursue that mission.”   Because “given our social conven-126tions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise sig-nified her own participation or approval of it,” Deborah had a right to be free of it.127In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court held that even student-ledand student-initiated prayers at high school football games, at least where conductedpursuant to a school policy authorizing an invocation of some sort, amounted to anunconstitutional endorsement of religion.128At first blush, this greater willingness to require the exclusion of religious per-spectives can also be seen as a guest for substantive neutrality among religions andbetween religion and irreligion—one that focuses on the message communicated bygovernment speech.  In the context of government speech, substantive neutrality looksa lot like Justice O’Connor’s principle of nonendorsement.  In her view, “govern-ment must not make a person’s religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in thepolitical community by conveying a message ‘that religion or a particular religiousbelief is favored or preferred.’”   Whether or not endorsement has occurred is to be129determined by a reasonable observer, familiar with the text and background of boththe First Amendment and of the challenged practice.130Although a majority of the Court has not expressly adopted nonendorsement,either generally or with respect to government speech cases,  the principle has great131explanatory power.   Consider, as an example, the Court’s most recent cases on132public displays of the Ten Commandments.
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545 U.S. 844, 856–57, 881 (2005). With respect to the Establishment Clause, substantive133neutrality and the protection of individual choice in religious matters can explain the votesof Justices Kennedy and O’Connor regarding government funding and government speech.See Laycock, supra note 25, at 70.See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 851–57.134 See id. at 868–73.135 Id. at 862.136 Id.137 See 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005).138 See id. at 681–82.139 Only Justice Breyer disagreed. See id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring).140 See id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]hese factors provide a strong . . . indication141that the Commandments’ text on this monument conveys a predominantly secular message.”).See id.142 Id. at 702–03 (Breyer, J., concurring).143
In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, a 5-4 plurality held thata municipal display of the Ten Commandments, even when accompanied by materialsdesigned to emphasize their historic role in the development of law and displayed inconjunction with secular materials, was unconstitutional.   The display was original;133and the county, having initially displayed only the Ten Commandments, added addi-tional nontheistic documents only in response to allegations that the initial display wasunconstitutional.   Writing for the majority, Justice Souter emphasized the govern-134mental purpose for the display, concluding that, in this context, the display was in-tended to—and did—convey a religious message secondary to a religious objective.135Justice Souter insisted that he was not advocating “judicial psychoanalysis of adrafter’s heart of hearts,”  but what an “‘objective observer’” would conclude about136the government’s purpose based upon “traditional external signs.”137This emphasis on the expressivist nature of government actions that this rea-sonable observer is thought to discern, turned out to be dispositive in Van Orden v.Perry,  decided the same day as McCreary.  Van Orden also involved a display of138the Ten Commandments, this time a free standing monument that had stood on thegrounds of the State Capitol in Austin, Texas for over forty years.   Unlike the dis-139play in McCreary, the Commandments were not paired with other historic sources oflaw.  Eight Justices thought the case was substantially the same as McCreary.140Justice Breyer disagreed and this made all the difference.  For Justice Breyer, areasonable observer, in spite of its expressly religious content, would not (or, perhapsmore accurately, should not) perceive a religious message.   The display in Van141Orden had stood for over forty years.   The absence of controversy for most of that142period demonstrated that the reasonable observer would “consider the religious aspectof the tablets’ message as part of what is a broader moral and historical messagereflective of a cultural heritage.”   In other words, the Van Orden display stood143because, at least in the mind of Justice Breyer, if no one else, it did not endorse thereligious sentiments it expressed.
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See id. at 694–95 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court’s precedent permits even the144slightest public recognition of religion to constitute establishment of religion.”). See infranote 143.See supra Part I.A., Part I.D.145 No modern Establishment Clause case considered by the Court involves such a claim,146other than in the sense that facilitating invocations of God implies that there is one and thatthose who say there is not must be wrong.See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 870–71 (2005) (“Foundations of147American Law and Government” exhibit included Ten Commandments on display with otherdocuments thought significant on historical foundation of American government). But see,Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644–45 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Given the odd basis forthe Court’s decision, invocations and benedictions will be able to be given at public schoolgraduations next June, as they have for the past century and a half, so long as school authoritiesmake clear that anyone who abstains from screaming in protest does not necessarily partici-pate in prayers.”).As Justice Thomas has observed, students exposed to what was taken as a state-148sponsored prayer at a graduation ceremony are not “‘coerced to pray’” but “[a]t most, . . . are‘coerced’ into possibly appearing to assent to the prayer.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 47 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). One separationist scholar hasobserved: “Many of the state actions the Supreme Court has deemed to violate theConstitution over the years have involved intangible establishments. Thatis, constitutional violations have often come in the form of state actionsthat do not actually force anyone to do anything against their personalfaith, but rather simply communicate that the government favors someform of religion in the abstract.”Stephen G. Gey, The No Religion Zone: Constitutional Limitations on Religious Associationin the Public Sphere, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1885, 1910 (2001).
II. THE ASYMMETRICAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Ambition of Nonendorsement
In and of itself, the prohibition of certain forms of endorsement might be a usefulguiding principle.  But the ambition of nonendorsement, first made clear in Engel,Abington, and Lee and as detailed by Justice Breyer in Van Orden, is staggering.As noted earlier, and consistent with the theme originating in Everson, Engel andAbington, endorsement can be very slight.   The endorsement can be vague enough144to encompass the views of almost everyone.  Engel and Lee, for example, involvedbrief nondenominational prayers, endorsing no theological propositions other thanthat there is a God who, perhaps, responds to intercessory prayer.   Endorsement of145a religious perspective need not involve any claim of exclusive truth or affirmation.146It can even consist of a speech that expressly disavows endorsement, merely acknowl-edging religious sentiment or belief as a source of our democracy or as somethingwhich is or has been believed by some of us at some time.   Prohibited endorsement147can occur even when the burden is conceded to be minimal or without any real assess-ment of the likelihood that it will have any real impact on religious choices.   We148
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For example, in Doe v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 2001),149the Court held that an issue of fact existed as to whether a volunteer “Clergy In the Schools”counseling program was an establishment, notwithstanding that the clergy were required tospeak from a secular perspective and wore no religious garb. Apparently their mere identitywas problematic. Upon remand, the district court found that the program constituted an establish-ment. See Oxford v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1114 (E.D. Tex. 2002).See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 614–15 (1989) (“The mere fact150that Pittsburgh displays symbols of both Christmas and Chanukah does not end the constitu-tional inquiry.”).See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680–81 (1983).151 See Stephen D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment152Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276–77 (1987).See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (striking down a law authorizing153a period of silence at school for prayer or meditation).See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596–97 (1987) (finding unconstitutional154a law that required either the banishment of teaching evolutionary theory in the classroom orthe presentation of a religious view rejecting the theory).See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 856–58 (2005) (recognizing that155the Ten Commandments greatly influenced Western legal thought).
require the government to not simply avoid intolerance, but to adhere to a rather elab-orate etiquette of sensitivity.   A holiday crèche scene might be unconstitutional149even if combined with a Chanukah menorah,  but may be permissible if displayed150in a way, such as alongside secular symbols, that convinces a majority—or the Justiceor Justices casting the deciding votes—that, as in Van Orden, no endorsement wasintended or reasonably perceived.151Shortly following Justice O’Connor’s promulgation of the endorsement list,Stephen Smith identified at least four forms of endorsement, roughly labeled:  (1) ex-clusive preferment of a belief; (2) endorsement of the truthfulness of a belief; (3) en-dorsement of the value of a belief; and, (4) recognition that many have believed.152Following the Court’s decisions in McCreary and Van Orden, it seems that a slimmajority of the Court believes that, at least, the first three may all be forbidden bythe Establishment Clause.There seems to be no doubt that if the government claimed explicitly that allbelievers are irrational (exclusive preferment) or that “Jesus saves” (endorsement oftruthfulness), the Establishment Clause would be violated.  It is hard to see how com-munication of the value of a particular religious belief would steer clear of Establish-ment Clause difficulty, given, for example, invalidation of laws providing for momentsof silence,  informing students of alternative views of the origins of life,  or acknowl-153 154edging the importance of the Ten Commandments in the development of the Westernlegal tradition.   If a purpose to validate or advance that belief is seen as dispositive,155government would walk a fine line in ever suggesting the value of any religious belief.It may be that only where, as in Van Orden, a court (or at least the decisive voteon a court) can conclude no claim is made, or perceived, regarding the value of a be-lief, that a government statement concerning that belief, if it is religious, can stand.
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See id. at 859 n.9.156 The line between acknowledging that many have believed and that this belief has value157is rather imprecise.Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).158 Id.159 Id.160 Id. at 699.161 Id. at 698–99.162 Id. at 698.163 Id. at 699.164
Because endorsement may be implicit—may, in fact, be found even where it claimsto be something else —one wonders how often endorsement in the fourth sense (a156recognition that many have believed) will be permitted.157Again, my point is not that the injury suffered by those in the position of DeborahWeisman is not real.  Nor do I wish to argue that there are no injuries of this type thatdeserve constitutional remedy.  At this point, I mean only to observe that the Court’sjurisprudence seeks to avoid a wide variety of subjective psychological injury and toimpose upon the state a rather exacting expressive goal.Justice Breyer, without apparent irony, recently summed up that goal.   The158purpose of the religion clauses is to promote “the fullest possible scope of religiousliberty” and “tolerance for all.”   They must be interpreted to avoid “divisiveness”159by maintaining “separation of church and state.”   But so much separation as to160“purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious” becausethat, too, would “promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeksto avoid.”   The state must not “engage in nor compel,” nor do anything resulting161in excessive “interference with, or promotion of” religion.   It must maintain this162perfect equipoise not only among “sects,” but between “religion and nonreligion.”163Justice Breyer can conceive of no test that might tell us whether government hasstrayed from the narrow path on which it must stay.   I should think not.164This ambition puts us in a bind.  Given the scope of the modern state and thediversity of religious perspectives, requiring a true neutrality between those claimingthat they have been exposed to a message that causes them to feel disfavored on reli-gious grounds would substantially restrict the state’s ability to speak and to enforce itto withdraw from much of what it does.  Not surprisingly, faced with an unenforce-able mandate of neutrality, courts have abandoned it.  If the endorsement of competingbeliefs or disapproval of the dissenter’s beliefs is expressed through secular speech orselective omission, courts have refused to find a constitutional injury.
B. The Asymmetrical Treatment of “Secular” Speech
While we might loosely refer to speech that, while not expressly religious, con-tradicts or marginalizes certain religious beliefs as “secular speech” that is not quiteaccurate or, if it is, the label is not pertinent.  Speech that communicates to some that
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Our annual Christmas wars, it seems to me, are more about the propriety of public165secularity than they are about decorations, music, and greetings.See Esenberg, supra note 11, at 31–32.166 This “clarification” of values may be mandatory as well as merely suggestive. It is not167unusual for a teacher certification program to require successful teaching candidates to ex-hibit a “commitment to social justice” and the National Council for Accreditation of TeacherEducation has expressly recognized this as a “disposition” that may be required for accredi-tation. See, e.g., Robert “K.C.” Johnson, Disposition For Bias, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUALRIGHTS IN EDUCATION, May 23, 2005, available at http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6250.html. At Washington State University, a student received negative values on “dispo-sitions” requiring him to be “sensitive to community and cultural norms” and to “appreciat[e]and valu[e] human diversity” allegedly because he was a self-described “conservative Christian”who did not believe that male and white privilege exist. Press Release, Foundation for IndividualRights in Education, Education Programs May Have a ‘Disposition’ for Censorship, (Sept. 21,2005) available at http://www.thefire.org/indexphp/article/6280.html.Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 447 F.3d1681187 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1089 (2006).See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,169474 U.S. 826 (1985) (objecting to a book in an English literature curriculum); Gheta v. NassauCounty Cmty. Coll., 33 F. Supp. 2d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (challenging a sexuality course).Even if the publicly expressed view is that religion is one of many more or less170
their religious beliefs are wrong will not be perceived as secular, nor will calling itsuch deprive it of religious significance.
1. Government Speech that Ignores Religious Perspectives
One frequent manifestation of asymmetry is in the exclusion or restriction ofreligious perspectives or messages under circumstances in which some—or perhapseven many—religious adherents believe them to be pertinent.  This is the driving forcebehind cases involving holiday displays, public monuments and voluntary prayer.  Theidea is that there ought to be public acknowledgment of major and widely shared reli-gious observations and of the perceived religious sources of law and human liberty.Dedication of public events, it is argued, ought to take place in a way that many citizenswill find meaningful.  To be told that there are certain ways in which this may not bedone can be, and is perceived as, a message of disapproval and marginalization.165But it is more than that.As I argued in an earlier piece, schools do much more than teach academic sub-jects unrelated to religious concerns.   They routinely engage students about how166and what to think about issues such as sexuality, tolerance for the choices and life-styles of others, diversity of races and cultures, and the environment.   “Education,”167as Judge Stephen Reinhardt recently noted, “serves higher civic and social functions,including the rearing of children into healthy, productive, and responsible adults andthe cultivation of talented and qualified leaders of diverse backgrounds.”168If, for example, a school encourages certain ways of moral decision-making ormaking choices about sexual activity  that may exclude, or minimize,  religious169 170
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equivalent considerations or portrayed as something that “some people” believe which maybe further explored outside the formal educational process. If what is constitutionally significantis the requirement that no one be made to feel like an outsider or to believe that the state dis-approves of his or her faith, “establishment” in the sense of endorsement may arise. Thosewho believe that duty to God is paramount will feel that duty has been slighted.See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987) (creationism); Epperson171v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 (1968) (evolution); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ.,185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (creation science);Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (intelligentdesign); Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363–64 (Tenn. 1927) (evolution).Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV.172146, 162 (1986).
considerations.  It is hardly a stretch to say that such instruction may reasonably beperceived by believers as a message that these perspectives are less important—andare certainly never to be urged upon others—even if no student complains that suchspeech directly contradicts her religious values.Even in the more traditionally “academic” realm, what schools say—or, again,do not say—about the role of religion in the nation’s history and current affairs haveimplications for students’ religious lives.  As we have seen, throughout most of thetwentieth and now into the twenty-first century, bitter controversy surrounds the factand manner of teaching evolution and whether to include alternatives ranging from“creation science” to “intelligent design.”   Even if, for example, teaching about evo-171lution makes no claims about (the absence of) a theological purpose or the implica-tions of scientific explanations for processes and phenomena once thought to be expli-cable only by invocation of the divine, students may nevertheless be indoctrinated intoa preference for materialism.  Judge Michael McConnell has put it this way:
If the public school day and all its teaching is strictly secular, thechild is likely to learn the lesson that religion is irrelevant to thesignificant things of this world, or at least the spiritual realm isradically separate and distinct from the temporal.  However unin-tended, these are lessons about religion.  They are not “neutral.”Studious silence on a subject that parents may say touches all oflife is an eloquent refutation.172
Although public education is the paradigmatic example of government speech,it is not the only one.  As the government has taken on greater responsibility for thedelivery of social services, what it communicates about, for example, how one escapespoverty or recovers from addiction, assumes a larger role in the public’s assump-tions and beliefs and about how such problems are to be addressed and what is to besaid about them.  Religious social services agencies, such as Catholic Charities andLutheran Social Services, have long been accused of becoming increasingly secular
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See, e.g., Rev. Robert A. Sirico, Taking the “Catholic” out of Catholic Charities: He173Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune, PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 1, 1998, available at http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/printarticle.asp?article=1364.Often the allegedly “secularizing” influence has been the prohibition of certain forms174of discrimination, such as on the basis of sexual orientation or religious belief, or mandates forservices, such as abortion or contraception, in a way that is claimed to be inconsistent witha religious organization’s mission.It may, in addition, “crowd out” religious providers as taxpayer-funded entities occupy175the field. See infra Part III.A.See Brief for International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting176Petitioners at 5–6, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665)(citing SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES90 (1998)).Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J. L. & POL. 329,177332 (2002).See, e.g., Genesis.178 See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006).179
as they grow more dependent on government funds.   The exclusion—or state man-173dated  modification—of religious perspectives may well be perceived as a message174of disapproval.175Public spaces, moreover, have always been places in which the state expresses thevalues of the community.  Plaques, public art and memorials purport to express andreinforce the values of the community.   If state-sponsored public acknowledgments176of various aspects of a community’s values and heritage must be secular, does the staterisk crowding out religious values and heritage by its failure to acknowledge them?The point is not that the failure to include religious perspectives ought to be a con-stitutional violation, but that doctrine that prohibits, or significantly restricts, theirinclusion will not be neutral as between them and competing secular perspectives.
2. Government Speech that Contradicts Religious Principles
Governmental messages may expressly contradict the religious views of thoseto whom they are directed.  While government may not directly address religious doc-trine “some of what schools do teach will imply that various religious perspectivesare untrue or unsound.”177For some, teaching evolution may contradict the belief that God created life andcalls into question the authority of a sacred text that, in their view, describes how Hecreated it.   This is particularly true where evolution is taught in a way that makes178teleological claims that go beyond the observable facts of evolution and its mecha-nisms.   Teaching students how to make their own decisions on moral questions179or the expression of their sexuality contradicts the notion that such matters requiresubmission to the will of God.Instruction on the equality of men and women may contradict the view of certainMuslims.  Teaching the social and moral equivalence of same-sex relations may seem
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Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).180 Q’uran, Book of Nissa, 6:34 (“Men are the protectors / And maintainers of women, /181Because Allah has given / The one more (strength) / Than the other, and because / Theysupport them / From their means. / Therefore the righteous women / [a]re devoutly obedient,and guard / In (the husband’s) absence / What Allah would have them guard. / As to thosewomen / On whose part ye fear / disloyalty and ill-conduct, / Admonish them (first), / (Next),refuse to share their beds, / (And last) beat them (lightly); / But if they return to obedience,/ Seek not against them / Means (of annoyance): / For Allah is Most High, Great (above youall).”) (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., Sh. Muhammad Ashraf 1969).Leviticus 18:22 (“You must not lie with a man, as with a woman: that is an182abomination.”).827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).183 Id. at 1060–61.184 Id. at 1061. The Mozert plaintiffs chose not to advance an Establishment Clause claim.185They sought to be exempted from the offending curriculum, not to change it. Id. at 1069.Id. at 1069.186 Id.187
to conflict with the view of conservative Christians about human sexuality.  That mes-sage, in and of itself, may interfere with “the preservation and transmission of religiousbeliefs” that the Lee Court “insisted be committed to the private sphere.”   That inter-180ference, moreover, may go beyond this particular subject.  If believers regard theseviews as explicitly set forth in the Q’uran  or the Bible,  the state has communicated181 182the notion that these sacred texts, which they may claim to be infallible, are wrong.
3. The Absence of a Remedy
a. Secular Speech as Interference with Free Exercise
One approach taken by those who feel aggrieved by these messages has been toargue that the communication of such messages—or at least the refusal to exempt non-adherents from having to receive them—is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.That approach has failed.As noted earlier, the classic case is Mozert v. Hawkins County Board. of Educa-tion.   In Mozert, plaintiffs argued that certain required readings in the Hawkins183County, Tennessee school district were offensive to and contradicted their religiousbeliefs.   For that reason, requiring their children to be exposed to such material184constituted a violation of their free exercise rights.   A divided panel of the Sixth185Circuit found no free exercise violation because the students were required neitherto affirm nor to deny any particular point of view.   In the Court’s view, “[w]hat186[was] . . . absent . . . [was] the critical element of compulsion to affirm or deny a reli-gious belief or to engage or refrain from engaging in a practice forbidden or requiredin the exercise of plaintiff’s religion.”   Public schools have the right, the Court187noted, to teach fundamental values “‘essential to a democratic society’” including
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Id. at 1068 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).188 Stolzenberg, supra note 29, at 605–06 (“After all, requiring impressionable children189to exhibit adherence to beliefs they do not (yet) hold is an effective way of cultivating adher-ence to those beliefs.”).Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 56 (2008).190 Id. at 90, 92–93.191 Id. at 90.192 Id. at 94 (quoting the Complaint filed by plaintiffs).193 Id. at 101–07.194 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).195 Id. at 879; accord, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.196520, 531 (1993).Compare Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools:197The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L.REV. 2209, 2220–21 (2005), with Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism andthe Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121–22 (1990).Parker, 514 F.3d at 98–99. As for the due process rights, see, for example, Wisconsin198v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).Parker, 514 F.3d at 101–07.199
“‘tolerance of divergent political and religious views.’”   This (and other aspects)188of the Mozert holding have been roundly criticized, not least of all for the Court’s fail-ure to recognize that exposure to, and the admonition to tolerate, certain “divergent”views were precisely what the plaintiffs argued was inconsistent with the exerciseof their religion.189Most recently in Parker v. Hurley,  the First Circuit rejected a Mozert-type190challenge brought by parents who objected to the use in kindergarten and first gradeclasses of books depicting families in which both parents were of the same gender andthe in-class reading of a book that depicted and celebrated a gay marriage.   As in191Mozert, the plaintiffs did not seek to ban the books from the school curriculum, butto be provided with notice of such materials and the opportunity to be exempted.192They argued that the classroom instruction interfered with their ability to inculcatetheir religious beliefs and that the children were “‘essentially’” required “‘to affirma belief inconsistent with and prohibited by their religion.’”193The court rejected both free exercise and establishment complaints.   Under the194Supreme Court’s current free exercise paradigm, announced in Oregon v. Smith,195the plaintiffs would have little prospect of success.  Under Smith, the Free ExerciseClause does not exempt persons from complying with neutral laws of general appli-cability.   Courts and commentators have differed as to what extent Smith’s rejection196of the need for heightened scrutiny of the state’s regulatory interest should be balancedagainst the plaintiff’s interest in being free of interference in “hybrid” cases —that197is, those cases in which a free exercise claim combined with another constitutionalobjection.   But the Parker court found that the challenged curriculum violated198neither the plaintiff’s free exercise rights nor the due process right of parents to controlthe education of their children.   It rejected the plaintiff’s free exercise claim because199
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Id. at 106 (citing Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.2001994); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. Of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063-65, 1070 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)); see also Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d542, 558 (10th Cir., 1997) (“[P]ublic schools are not required to delete from the curriculumall materials that may offend any religious sensibility.”); cf. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (distinguishing between compelling students to declare a beliefthrough mandatory recital of the pledge of allegiance, which violates free exercise, and“merely . . . acquaint[ing students] with the flag salute so that they may be informed as towhat it is or even what it means”) (citations omitted).Parker, 514 F.3d at 99–100, 105 (“The parents allege neither coercion in the form of201a direct interference with their religious beliefs, nor compulsion in the form of punishmentfor their beliefs, as in Yoder.”); see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210–12.Parker, 514 F.3d at 99–100.202 Id. at 102.203 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).204
it lacked an allegation of coercion and declined to recognize a free exercise right tobe free of indoctrination.
Public schools are not obliged to shield individual students fromideas which potentially are religiously offensive, particularlywhen the school imposes no requirement that the student agreewith or affirm those ideas, or even participate in discussions aboutthem. . . .  The reading of King and King was not instruction inreligion or religious beliefs.200
With respect to the due process claim, the court distinguished Wisconsin v. Yoder,holding that the state may not require Amish families to send their children to schoolpast the eighth grade as involving a greater degree of compulsion.   The court rea-201soned that the plaintiffs, objecting to the curricular materials, were not seeking topreserve a largely separate exposure and faced no sanctions for withdrawal.   They202could simply choose to send their children to private schools.203The results are not surprising within the four corners of free exercise doctrine.Quite apart from whether the challenged practices constitute neutral laws of generalapplicability, the Court has generally required that a dissenter be coerced into violatingher religious beliefs or that a state measure penalize religious activity by denying her“an equal share of the rights, benefits and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”   No204free exercise case has required that government be required to speak and act in amanner acceptable to a litigant’s religious beliefs.
b. Secular Speech as Establishment
But government’s ability to speak and to act has been found to be restricted by theEstablishment Clause and, in the post-Everson era, the absence of coercion or penalty
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655 F.Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev’d, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).205 Id. For example, District Judge Brevard Hand found that home economics textbooks206promoted an “individualistic,” “relativist,” and utilitarian form of moral decision-making.Id. at 986.Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 827 F.2d 684, 693 (11th Cir. 1987).207 Id. at 692.208 Id. at 693.209 See, e.g., Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994); Brown210v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994). An Establishment Clauseclaim was also made in Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001), cert.denied, 534 U.S. 827 (2001). Although the plaintiffs lacked standing for some of their claims,the Court reached a claim brought by the guardian of a student that a high school Earth Daycelebration constituted establishment of religion worshiping the Earth—or “Gaia”—as a livingthing and interfered with the plaintiff’s guardian’s free exercise rights. A unanimous panel ofthe Second Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion that an objective observerwould view the celebration as endorsing Gaia or Earth worship. Id. at 79. It rejected theplaintiff’s free exercise claim based upon the absence of any evidence that attendance at theceremony was compulsory. Id. at 80; cf. Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County, 419 F.Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Ky. 2006), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1318 (2009) (noting that studentsexposed to sensitivity training alleged to inculcate positive view of homosexuality does notcompel students to disavow their religious principles or endorse homosexuality). Most often,courts will avoid Establishment claims by characterizing a refusal to move from a secularbaseline as supported by an interest in avoiding the perception of religious endorsement orin avoiding religious controversy. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985)(O’Connor, J., concurring); Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1097 (2006).277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 886 (2002).211
has been largely irrelevant.  In virtually no modern Establishment Clause case, cer-tainly not in Engel, Edwards, Abington, Wallace, Lee, Santa Fe, or McCreary, wasanyone compelled to affirm anything.Nevertheless, the claim that pervasive secularism violates the EstablishmentClause has also failed.  In Board of School Commissioners v. Smith,  the trial court205held that certain textbooks used in Alabama elementary and secondary schools violatedthe Establishment Clause because they advanced the religion of secular humanismand inhibited theistic religion.   The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dis-206agreed.   In its view, the texts conveyed a message of “independent thought, tolerance207of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance, and logical decision-making,”and this was an “entirely appropriate secular effect.”   The absence of a discussion of208religion, it concluded, did not convey a message of approval of secular humanism.209Other cases considering allegations of an “establishment” of secularism have generallyreached similar conclusions.210Even where government has arguably directly denounced a religious tradition orgroup, plaintiffs have struggled.  An illustrative example is the Ninth Circuit’s deci-sion in American Family Association v. San Francisco.   Certain conservative211Christian organizations ran a newspaper advertisement proclaiming that, while
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Id. at 1118–19.212 Id. at 1119.213 Id.214 Id.215 Id. at 1119–20.216 Id. at 1120.217 Id.218 Id. at 1121.219
Christians love homosexuals, “God abhors any form of sexual sin,” including“homosexuality, premarital sex or adultery.”   The ad stated:212
For years, Christians have taken a stand in the public square againstaggressive homosexual activism. We’ve paid a heavy price, withsound-bite labels like “bigot” and “homophobe.”  But all alongwe’ve had a hand extended, something largely unreported in themedia . . . an open hand that offers healing for homosexuals, notharassment.  We want reason in this debate, not rhetoric.  Andwe want to share the hope we have in Christ, for those who feelacceptance of homosexuality is their only hope.213
In response, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors sent a letter to the groupscondemning the acts as “hateful rhetoric,” and claiming a direct correlation betweentheir message and crimes against gays and lesbians.   The Board passed a resolution214condemning the murder of a gay man in Alabama and calling “for the Religious Rightto take accountability for the impact of their long-standing rhetoric denouncing gaysand lesbians, which leads to a climate of mistrust and discrimination that can open thedoor to horrible crimes.”215The Board also passed a resolution naming one of the plaintiff Christian organi-zations and suggesting that ads encouraging gays and lesbians to change their sexualorientation “are erroneous and full of lies.”   This resolution said that ads suggesting216that “gays and lesbians are ‘immoral and undesirable create an atmosphere whichvalidates oppression of gays and lesbians’ and encourages maltreatment of them.”217Additionally, the Board passed a resolution calling upon local television stations toboycott the ads.218Applying the Lemon test, the Ninth Circuit noted that “although the letter andresolutions may appear to contain attacks on the Plaintiffs’ religious views, in par-ticular that homosexuality is sinful, there is also a plausible secular purpose in thedefendants’ actions—protecting gays and lesbians from violence.”   Although noting219that there is little guidance in determining whether a government action has the pri-mary purpose of inhibiting religion, the majority concluded that while “the letter andresolution may contain over-generalizations about the Religious Right, at times mis-construe the Plaintiffs’ message, and may be based on a tenuous perceived connection
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between the Plaintiffs’ advertisements and the increase in violence against gays andlesbians,” none of this “make[s] religious hostility the primary effect of the Defendants’actions.”   Although conceding that the letter and resolution might create division220along religious lines, it concluded that political divisiveness alone cannot create anEstablishment Clause violation,  or else “government bodies would be at risk any221time they took an action that affected potentially religious issues, including abortion,alcohol use, other sexual issues, etc.”   The majority also rejected the plaintiffs’ Free222Exercise claim, concluding (without mentioning the call for a boycott) that no reli-gious conduct was affected by the defendants’ conduct.223Judge Noonan dissented. Writing that “[t]o assert that a group’s religious mes-sage and religious categorization of conduct are responsible for murder is to attackthe group’s religion,” and that it is “difficult to think of a more direct attack.”   He224concluded:
The city is saved as to its purpose by its plausible purpose of seek-ing to reduce violence against gays and lesbians; but this plausiblepurpose does not neutralize the effect of the means chosen by thecity—a means that achieves its effect by its assertion of a directcorrelation between the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and the killingof human beings.  It is difficult to believe that any informed andreasonable observer could think that the primary effect of the city’smessage was, “Don’t incite violence against gays and lesbians.”The city, well aware of the plaintiffs’ advertising campaign pro-claiming their love for homosexuals, knew that such a conven-tional admonition would have been brushed off as a bromide withan “Of course not.”  To reach the plaintiffs, to strike at what thecity perceived as a danger, the city had to strike at the heart of theplaintiffs’ religious belief, to focus on their belief that the conductthey were trying to change was an offense to God and to makethat belief responsible for murder.225
“Suppose a city council,” Judge Noonan observed ,“. . . adopted a resolutioncondemning Islam because its teachings embraced the concept of a holy war and so,the resolution said, were ‘directly correlated’ with the bombing of the World TradeCenter.”   While a purpose of the resolution might be to discourage bombings,226
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Id. Judge Noonan also noted that the complaint alleged that television stations had, in227fact, refused to air the plaintiffs’ ad as a result of the resolution, creating an issue as to whetherthey had suffered an official sanction. Id.345 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d in part, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006),228cert. granted and judgment vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).Id. at 1100.229 Id.230 Id. at 1101.231 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178, cert. granted and judgment vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).232 Id. at 1192.233 Id. at 1188.234 Id.235 Id. at 1188–89.236
Judge Noonan asked (rhetorically) if “any reasonable, informed observer [would]doubt that the primary effect of such an action by a city could be the expression ofofficial hostility to the religion practiced by a billion people?”227In Harper v. Poway Unified School District,  a student, in response to a school228sponsored “Day of Silence” promoting tolerance for gays and lesbians, wore a home-made T-shirt expressing his disapproval of homosexuality on religious grounds.229The shirt read “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD CON-DEMNED” handwritten on the front and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL”written on the back.   Although the district court denied his motion for a preliminary230injunction, he was found to have stated establishment and free exercise claims at leastin part because school officials had told him to “leave his faith ‘in his car,’” and thatChristianity was “not based on hate” and, therefore, he should not offend others.231On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminaryinjunction on free speech grounds, emphasizing the “disruptive nature” of Harper’sspeech and finding that schools may restrict speech that “attacks high school studentswho are members of minority groups that have historically been oppressed, subjectedto verbal and physical abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidatethem, as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunityto learn.”   The majority held that Harper had not demonstrated a reasonable likeli-232hood of success on his Free Exercise or Establishment Clause claims.233With respect to Harper’s free exercise claim, the majority found that there wasno substantial burden on his religious practice because he was not compelled to affirma repugnant belief.   He was not penalized or discriminated against because of his234religious views, or was the availability of a benefit conditioned on violation of a tenetof his faith.   It noted the school’s interest in prohibiting disruption of the educa-235tional process or “physical and psychological injury to young people entrusted totheir care.”236In response to Harper’s allegation that school officials tried to change his beliefsor told him that his interpretation of Christianity was wrong, the majority character-ized the challenged behavior as an attempt to change his inflammatory conduct and
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that, in any event, “school officials’ statements and any other school activity intendedto teach Harper the virtues of tolerance constitute a proper exercise of a school’s educa-tional function, even if the message conflicts with the views of a particular religion.”237The majority also rejected Harper’s Establishment Clause claim.  It suggestedthat nonestablishment, as opposed to free exercise, is more properly concerned withgovernment measures that advance religion and concluded that the school had asecular purpose in teaching “secular democratic values” that neither advanced norinhibited religion.238Judge Kozinski dissented on free speech grounds.  He did not believe that therecord supported the claim that the t-shirt would cause substantial disruption or invadethe rights of others.   Having introduced the topic of homosexuality, the school could239not, in his view, engage in viewpoint discrimination even to protect minorities.240He also thought Harper was likely to prevail on a claim that the school’s harassmentpolicy was overly broad.241Condemnation of a religious group by the San Francisco Board of Supervisorswas once again at issue in Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City andCounty of San Francisco.   In March 2006, Cardinal William Joseph Levada, the242head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, directed the Archdiocese ofSan Francisco to stop placing children in need with homosexual couples.   In re-243sponse, the Board passed a resolution that expressed outrage that “a foreign country,like the Vatican, meddles with” the city’s “existing and established customs.”   It said244that his decree was “absolutely unacceptable to the citizenry of San Francisco.”   It245called Cardinal Levada’s directive “hateful and discriminatory rhetoric [that] is bothinsulting and callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and ignorance . . . seldomencountered” by the Board.   Referring to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the246Faith as the former “Holy Office of the Inquisition,” the resolution called on CardinalLevada to withdraw his doctrine and for the San Francisco Archdiocese to defy it.247The District Court had little trouble rejecting a challenge to the resolution.   Although248the state “may be perceived as pejorative,” the court found it clear from the text of thestatute that any “criticism” was presented “in the context of same-sex adoption—a
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secular dimension of the City’s culture and tradition,”  it saw the call upon the249archdiocese to defy the order as a secular attempt to promote same-sex adoption andnon-discrimination “rather than meddling with internal church affairs.”   “Elected250officials,” it concluded, “are certainly free to express their electorates’ views.”251
III. THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRY
Much, then, seems to turn on whether a government message uses expresslytheological propositions.  Perhaps one could argue that the insult is somehow lessfundamental if it avoids direct comment on what are thought to be core religious prin-ciples, such as whether there is a God, Jesus is the Messiah, and the Q’uran is the wordof God.  In this view, the insult is simply a product of living in a society in which noteveryone shares the same religious beliefs and no sectarian group is entitled to havethe temporal implications of its faith made into public policy.  Whatever insult resultsfrom, say, the teaching of evolution or the acceptance of gays and lesbians, is simplythe inevitable consequence of democratic give and take in a pluralistic society.A. Asymmetry Does Not Satisfy Substantive or Endorsement Neutrality
Some commentators have endorsed this, arguing that establishment of “non-religion” would require the express advocacy of an agnostic or atheistic position.252To quote one commentator, as long as the schools have not taught “that there is noGod,” the fact that they have taught values and methods of reaching them incompatiblewith some students’ religious view is unproblematic.   Several lower courts, faced253with an argument that the exclusion of expressions of faith from public life constitutesan establishment of secularism, stated the need for some active advocacy, as opposedto the mere assumption, of irreligion.   In an attempt to justify such an approach,254Steven Shiffrin argues that while there may be no distinction between these assertionsas a matter of “logical entailment,” there is as a matter of “social meaning.”255In this view, the disfavored position of religious dissenters who claim harm frompublic secularity is the price we pay for religious freedom.  Secularity is the commonground that must be accepted in order to avoid, as Kathleen Sullivan put it, the warof “all against all” and domination of the majority.256
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See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Numerous state laws257also prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion or creed in employment and other contexts.See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2008) (religion); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463(2008) (religion); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402 (West 2008) (creed and religion); 775ILL. COM P. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103 (West 2008) (religion); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572(2008) (religion); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2008) (creed and religion); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2008) (creed); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030 (West 2008) (religion);WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2008) (creed).Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEM P. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 320258(1996).See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (claiming that “[i]n a free government259the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights . . . consist[ing] in theone case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects”). Madisonargued that “the utmost freedom of religion,” actually “arises from that multiplicity of sects,which pervades America, and which is the best and only security for religious liberty in anysociety.” James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’CONSTITUTION 88 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).Gerald V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy—A “Privatization” Theory of the Religion Clause260Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275, 276–77 (1986).Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1666,2611712 (2006).
The argument is that religion is foundational in a way that other beliefs are not.Because it addresses matters of ultimate concern, religion’s claim on adherents isuniquely strong and tantamount to an immutable characteristic like race and gender.Thus, religion is commonly a prohibited basis for discrimination.   Because of this,257the argument continues, individuals are uniquely sensitive to messages that are contraryto their beliefs about religion, including beliefs regarding the uncertainty or nonexis-tence of God.  Even if disputes about religion do not actually result in greater divisionthan those about politics, religious insults are alienating in a way that others are not.258When the government takes a position on religious matters that is contrary to that ofits citizens, nonadherents are more likely to perceive it as an attack on their identity andtake it as a message that they are disfavored members of the political community.Of course, there is no constitutional injunction against division as such and muchof our constitutional jurisprudence holds that a multiplicity of views and a marketplaceof ideas are good things.  In fact, James Madison famously believed that the answer tofactionalism was to permit each faction full access to the public square.   As Professor259Gerald Bradley has noted, perhaps the Court, on matters of religion, has abandonedMadison’s vision of “manageable conflict” and turned instead to the “privatization”of faith.260But the larger problem is that it does not work and the notion that faith ought tobe “privatized” is anything but substantively neutral.  To borrow from Richard Garnett,limiting the “nonendorsement” principle to the expressly religious “depends on thepossibility of identifying such matters and distinguishing them meaningfully fromother ‘matters’ about which people deeply disagree.”   He notes that “[f]or many261
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religious people, much or even all that they do—whether or not it is done in the con-text of prayer, liturgy, or ritual—is ‘religious.’”   If this is the case, then a line drawn262that prohibits explicitly religious assertions but permits secular assertions withoutregard to how they may contradict the religious beliefs of those who hear them is un-likely to avoid division.  The extant evidence—continued litigation and complaints ofa secular public square—suggests that it does not.One can imagine two expressive harms or impacts from government messagesconcerning religion.  The first is that it may express impermissible attitudes towardpersons or groups.   Nonestablishment, at least as conceived in the post-Everson era,263is concerned not only with political equality, but also with social equality—at leastas far as the government is concerned.  Nonendorsement, then, serves an importantexpressivist purpose, namely, to make clear that religion is not a marker of politicalstatus or a basis for exclusion.  It is a statement about equality, tolerance, and inclu-sion.  As Dean Chemerinsky puts it, everyone is entitled to assume that the govern-ment is “theirs;”  or if it is not, that the basis for alienation is not religious.  The264second is that it forms and shapes them—that is, it expresses and inculcates socialvalues and norms.265In each of these cases discussing “secular” messages, government speech wasnevertheless claimed to communicate something about citizens’ religious beliefs.Although nonadherents were not coerced or asked to affirm offending beliefs, thiswould not, as we have seen, excuse messages perceived to endorse religion.  Theabsence of coercion has never, or at least not recently, been a required element of anEstablishment Clause claim.  Although the government’s messages were not explic-itly religious in the sense of using theological language or making assertions aboutextratemporal matters, to argue that there is a meaningful distinction between advo-cacy for a set of ideas that are completely inconsistent with a proposition and expressdenial of the proposition is to insult the intelligence of the hearer.266As the Mozert line of cases—and our hypothetical Dick and Jane—illustrate, theexclusion or limitation of religious perspectives when they are, in the view of many,pertinent or the communication of messages contrary to certain citizens’ strongly heldreligious beliefs does convey religious insult.  If we are concerned with the messagesthat objective observers will draw from this, it is that religious beliefs—or their tem-poral implications—are either not appropriate for public discourse or that they are
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See supra Part II. B.3.b.267 Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary268Debates in Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding ReligiousExpression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAM E L. REV. 433, 479–81 (1999).See FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERM ACHER, THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, 16–17 (H.R. MacIntosh &269J.S. Steward eds., T&T Clark, Ltd. 1928) (1830).PAUL TILLICH, 1 SYSTEM ATIC THEOLOGY 110 (1951).270 Brady, supra note 268, at 488.271 Id. at 490 (citing GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND272THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE 33–41 (1984)).See, e.g., KATHRYN TANNER, THEORIES OF CULTURE: A NEW  AGENDA FOR THEOLOGY273(1997).Id. at 114.274
inherently subjective and are more or less incomprehensible outside of the communityof believers.  That they cannot—and perhaps even ought not—be asserted outside thecommunity of adherents.  Thus, those in the position of Chase Harper are told to keeptheir religion in their car.267The idea that such ostensibly secular messages convey religious insult and interferewith religious formation is buttressed by recent—and widely accepted—scholarshipon the nature of religious formation.  Sociologists of religion and theologians haveincreasingly turned away from an individualized or “private” view of religion in whichone’s search for meaning is private and taken fundamentally.  As Professor KathleenBrady has pointed out, “modern” theology was rooted in Kant’s argument that one can-not know a thing in itself (“noumena”), including God, but only the “phenomenon”of experience, and in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s subsequent adoption of that idea totheology.   For Schleiermacher, religion becomes far more subjective, a feeling of268“absolute dependence.”   For those writing in this modern tradition, human beings269are innately religious—that is, we have common intuitions or feelings that point to, inthe words of Paul Tillich, “the ground of our being.”   Although we may well feel270compelled to express or reinforce religious experiences and emotions in community,“human nature begins with a divine orientation which will inevitably express itselfin communal forms without external prodding or support.”271What Brady refers to as the “postliberal” challenge to modern theology arguethat religions resemble languages or cultures, and that “people do not become religiousby tapping into a religious dimension that exists as a pre-reflective or pre-thematicexperience in the depths of self,” but “by being ‘socialized’ into a religious communityand by ‘interioriz[ing]’ a set of skills by practice and training.’”   Other scholars272writing in this tradition have argued that, in addition to being formed in community,religion is porous and “permeable”—that is, religious communities interact with thelarger culture  and, thus, will “always share[] cultural forms with its wider host cul-273ture and other religions.”   In other words, they are influenced by what occurs during274the rest of the week and outside the doors of houses of worships and homes.  Bradywrites, “for postliberals, humans all ‘stand within traditions,’ and truth is something
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which can be attained only in and through particular religious communities.”275People do not rely on reason to reach religion as Jefferson envisioned, nor do they findit deep within the self or as the result of a direct revelation from God to the individual.Rather, they learn it, and thus, it is only in the context of particular religious communi-ties that it makes sense to talk about religious truth.276If this is so, then the expansion of government in daily life will magnify the in-fluence of what the government says and there is no reason to believe that its impacton religious choice and upon the political standing of adherents will turn on the useof expressly theological language or the assertion of metaphysical claims.Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence assumes that the voice of governmentcarries great weight and that its endorsement of a religious position may place greatpressure on religious dissenters to conform.  It may have a disproportionate influenceand “crowd out” religious perspectives that are inconsistent with the state’s message.There is little reason to believe that this pressure and influence is avoided by messagesthat, while avoiding theological language, are just as inconsistent with theologicalpresuppositions as explicitly theological claims.To believe otherwise is to choose to assume one particular interpretive choice asa matter of law.  We have, again, constructed the “reasonable observer” of our choice.It seems evident that real world dissidents do not ascribe to Professor Shiffrin’s socialmeaning and that to tell our hypothetical Jane to choose one meaning over another istantamount to telling her to, in Dean Garvey’s words, “cover your ears!”   Although277that may be a perfectly reasonable bit of advice, it is not the way we treat even themost bland religious expressions.  We may well need to modify doctrine in a way thattells dissenters, under certain circumstances, to cover their ears.  In fact, I believe thatwe do.  But if there is a justification for treating offending messages differently basedupon their use—or non-use—of express religious language, it is not because one formof speech impacts dissenters differently than the other.The distinction between express religious expression and the communication ofmessages that might be understood to convey an implied religious message, moreover,has not generally been thought to resolve establishment concerns.The Court has long recognized the potential for endorsement of a religious propo-sition by secular language.  In Epperson v. Arkansas, the mere exclusion of secularmessages, where thought to be religiously motivated, was found to constitute an estab-lishment.   In Edwards v. Aguillard, as we have seen, the Supreme Court struck down278a law requiring that creation science be taught in public school whenever evolutionwas taught.   Although the law defined creation science as “the scientific evidences279
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for [creation or evolution] and inferences from those scientific evidences,”  the Court280found that the law’s “purpose” was to advance religion (as it certainly was) and, there-fore, the law violated the Establishment Clause.   It emphasized the right of families281to “entrust public schools with the education of their children” with the assurance thatthose schools would not “advance religious views that may conflict with the privatebeliefs of the student and his or her family.”   But that interest is precisely what282prompts parental objections to the teaching of evolution or to the exclusion of alter-native views of the origins of life.As I have noted in a previous article, the difficulty is
not finessed by reference to the well-known rule that governmentis not barred from communicating a particular message simply be-cause it is consistent or inconsistent with the tenets of a religion.The problem is not simply that government has taken a positionthat happens to run afoul of a tenet of someone’s religion or issimply consistent with an atheistic or agnostic world view but thatit has systematically, whether by constitutional fiat, fear of litiga-tion, or a secularist bent, ruled out—or restricted—religion as anapproach to whatever information is being imparted or servicebeing provided, effectively denying its relevance.  The exclusionis neither happenstance nor partial.283
To argue, as does Andrew Koppelman, that government may establish all orthodoxiesbut religious ones, is to say something about religion.284
B. Asymmetry and Mediating Institutions
Even if asymmetry cannot be justified in terms of individual liberty, or of substan-tive neutrality toward the religious choices of its citizens, perhaps it can be seen as aform of jurisdictional limit, as a means of protecting the institutional prerogatives ofchurches, mosques, synagogues and other voluntary religious associations.  In otherwords, as many have argued, asymmetry protects churches by keeping the eight-hundred pound gorilla of the state from involving itself with theological matters.Such a view is suggested by recent scholarly emphasis on First Amendment insti-tutions and the religion clauses as a demarcation of jurisdiction between church and
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state.   This view certainly seems consistent with much of what we have from285Madison and other founding era proponents of religious liberty and disestablishmentwho emphasized the superior demands of God and a conscience which, for them, wasmost likely to be based in religious faith.  It is also consistent with the view, expressedby Roger Williams and others, that the “wilderness” of the state corrupts the “garden”of true religion.286There are a number of theories concerned with the role of voluntary associationsas mediating institutions—that is, as sources of values and social capital that, whileperhaps complementary with the state, are independent of it.  We may consider the ideaof subsidiarity—the notion, most commonly associated with Catholic social thought,287that a community of the “higher order” ought to interfere as little as possible with thoseof a lower order.   Tocqueville wrote of the value of “associationalism” in sustain-288ing American democracy.  A similar, but not quite identical idea, is rooted in Dutchtheologian and politician Abraham Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty.289Although the Establishment Clause cannot be said to have “enacted” or even tohave been informed by notions such as sphere sovereignty or subsidiarity (neither ofwhich existed in present form at the time it was written), some scholars have suggestedthat they have antecedents that may well have influenced American thinking.   In any290event, the notion of the independence of the Church and religious formation consciencefrom the state can be found in the historical record and the idea may be a useful lensthrough which to view Establishment Clause asymmetry, but not, as we will see, toreconcile it.  Even if we move from an individual to an institutional view and from anemphasis upon lack of state interference to facilitation of the proper roles of separatespheres, asymmetry remains problematic.
1. Subsidiarity
Often traced to Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum, subsidiarityemphasizes the existence of independent institutions with an autonomy that is notsubject to state control or interference.  Leo emphasized the family:
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Provided, therefore, the limits which are prescribed by the verypurpos s for which it exists be not transgressed, th  family has atleast equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of thethings needful to its preservation and its just liberty.  We say, “atleast equal rights;” for, inasmuch as the domestic household isantecedent, as well in idea as in fact, to the gathering of men intoa community, the family must necessarily have rights and dutieswhich are prior to those of the community, and founded moreimmediately in nature.  If the citizens, if the families on enteringinto association and fellowship, were to experience hindrance ina commonwealth instead of help, and were to find their rightsattacked instead of being upheld, society would rightly be anobject of detestation rather than of desire.  The contention, then,that the civil government should at its option intrude into andexercise intimate control over the family and the household is agreat and pernicious error.291
Forty years later, in his 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, Pope Pius XI cau-tioned that “it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance ofright order, to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinateorganizations can do.”   Much later, Pope John XXIII argued that “the founding of292a great many . . . intermediate groups or societies for the pursuit of aims which it is notwithin the competence of the individual to achieve efficiently, is a matter of greaturgency.”   In Gaudium et Spes, Pope Paul VI emphasized that “[r]ulers must be293careful not to hamper the development of family, social or cultural groups, nor that ofintermediate bodies or organizations, and not to deprive them of opportunities for legiti-mate and constructive activity; they should willingly seek rather to promote the orderlypursuit of such activity.”   In their respective spheres, he argued, “[t]he Church and294the political community in their own fields are autonomous and independent fromeach other.”   Thus, the realm of the Church ought to be free of state interference.295Subsidiarity is not a Madisonian notion, seeing the respective realms of society—the state, churches, universities, business—as checks and balances upon each other;296but rather sees society as “a complex web of family, social, religious, and governmentalties with the ultimate goal of encouraging and empowering the individual exercise of
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responsibility.”   It has aspects of positive, as well as negative liberty.   It is not297 298simply a doctrine mandating restraints upon power and is not “adequately representedas a question of scale (lowest possible level), and even less of devolution” of powerfrom the state to “lesser” institutions.   As Robert Vischer has written, “the gov-299ernment has an obligation to ensure the efficacy of mediating structures . . . .”300Sometimes, he stated, subsidiarity requires the government to intervene although itmay not “eviscerat[e] the real limitations on such intervention.   Thus, in Dignitatis301Humanae, the Second Vatican Council, while insisting upon the independent spheresof the Church and state, and that one may not direct the activity of the other, teachesthat the state must recognize and promote the religious life of its citizens.302In the same way, the church may interact with and influence larger society, butnot by the exercise of its authority or by participation in the exercise of civil power.Rather, it is the community of believers (in Catholic terms, the laity) whose role it is“to see that the divine law is inscribed in the life of the earthly city.”   In sum, subsidi-303arity’s “guiding principle is that intervention should ‘assist but not usurp’ mediatingstructures.”   This implies both limits and obligations on the various social spheres.304
2. Associationalism
Writing on the Rehnquist Court, John McGinnis has summarized its jurisprudenceas Tocquevillian:305
Tocqueville believed that while political factions try to use gov-ernment coercion for their own ends, civil associations organize
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to meet the common goals of their members.  Civil associationspromote reciprocity among their members and create social normsfrom which other individuals can voluntarily choose.  In this waythey generate what modern sociologists would call social capital:the glue that binds society together through a group of interlock-ing networks.306
For Tocqueville, the “vibrancy, innovation, and beneficence of American societydid not come from its rulers but bubbled up from below.”   Religion was essential307to the vibrancy of American democracy, and was separated politically from the statenot to protect “secular people” but to prevent it “from being corrupted into somethingless than itself.”   Although there is obviously much more to be said about this, the308idea is again one, not only of jurisdictional division, but of complementarity.In fact, Professor McGinnis argues that the Rehnquist Court sought to rediscoverand empower decentralizing structures, including religious associations.   This objec-309tive, in his view, suggests greater leeway for government to provide equal fundingopportunities for private schooling, including sectarian schools.310Drawing on the insights of public choice theory regarding the distortion of demo-cratic decision-making by special interests,  Professor McGinnis argues that the311Rehnquist Court can be seen as encouraging the development of mediating institu-tions as “discovery machines” for the generation of potentially beneficial values andnorms in a jurisprudence of “spontaneous order.”312Significantly, for our purposes, Professor McGinnis cites Michael McConnell’sobservation that “‘as long as the domain of collective decision making is small, reli-gious freedom is protected . . . as a byproduct of a limited state.  As the domain ofgovernment increases in scope, some government involvement in religious activitybecomes necessary if religious exercise is to be possible at all.’”   In other words, a313change in the role—and size—of the state may influence its proper relationship withsubsidiary institutions.  Thus, once again, the state is seen as having the freedom, if notthe constitutional duty, to act in a way that empowers mediating structures.  In such aworld, literal reliance on Madison’s insistence that “not three pence” go to the support
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of religion,”  may be an anachronism.  Given, for example, the taxation for public314education, as long as it acts on a neutral basis, “the state is empowered to help createan infrastructure that enables associations organized for an educational purpose.”315
3. Sphere Sovereignty
Echoing the Catholic notion of subsidiarity, Abraham Kuyper, writing in theCalvinist tradition, believed that
[T]he family, the business, science, art and so forth are all socialspheres, which do not derive the law of their life from the supe-riority of the state, but obey a high authority within their ownbosom; an authority which rules by the “grace of God,” just asthe sovereignty of the State does.316
For Kuyper, the state, although bound by God’s ordinance (as, in his view, was the en-tire creation), was not so compelled directly or “even by the proclamation of any churchbut only via the consciences of persons in positions of authority.”   At the same317time, “[t]he State may never become an octopus, which stifles the whole of life.”318Once again, however, the image is organic.  The state, he wrote, “must occupyits own place, on its own root, among all the other trees of the forest, and thus it hasto honor and maintain every form of life which grows independently in its own sacredautonomy.”   It should be noted, moreover, that Kuyper did not see the state’s sphere319as including the promotion of a public secularity:
All [the gospel] asks is unlimited freedom to develop in accor-dance with its own genius in the heart of our national life.  We donot want the government to hand over unbelief handcuffed andchained as though for a spiritual execution.  We prefer that thepower of the gospel overcome that demon in free combat withcomparable weapons.  Only this we do not want:  that the gov-ernment arm unbelief to force us, half-armed and handicapped byan assortment of laws, into an unequal struggle with so powerfulan enemy.  Yet that has happened and is happening still.  It hap-pens in all areas of popular education, on the higher as well as the
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lower levels, by means of the power of money, forced examina-tions, and official hierarchy.  For this reason we may never desistfrom our protest or resistance until the gospel recover its freedomto circulate, until the performance of his Christian duty will againbe possible for every Dutch citizen, whether rich or poor.320
C. Government Speech as Interference with Mediating Institutions
Paul Horowitz, drawing upon Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty, divides, asI have here, Establishment Clause concerns into two categories:  “[T]hose involvingequal funding and equal access to the public square for religious institutions, and thoseinvolving . . . ‘symbolic support’ for religious institutions.”   He argues that, as long321as other sovereign spheres are entitled to funding or to access to public facilities,“churches should be in a similar position, provided that government does not inter-fere too much in their internal operations.”   On the other hand, “‘[t]he sovereignty322of the State and the sovereignty of the Church’ are mutually limiting, and that both areharmed if they intertwine.”   Religious institutions “‘mark the limits of state juris-323diction by addressing spiritual matters that lie beyond the temporal concerns of gov-ernment.’”   Therefore, Professor Horwitz concludes, government “has no business324weighing in on religious questions or endorsing particular religious messages.”325Similarly, Professor McGinnis, in his discussion of associationalism, distinguishesfunding and forum cases from those involving government speech.  Defending Leeand Santa Fe, he argues that “government can facilitate competition between normsby providing resources that are neutral among them, but it cannot itself enter the arenaon the side of one set of religious norms or another.”   Religious messages, therefore,326remain outside the province of the state.These are reasonable arguments—well stated and tightly made.  But, as ProfessorHorwitz recognizes,  there is another side to the story.  Respect for the separate327spheres of the state and the church is likely to work only if there is at least roughagreement on the contours of those spheres and a commitment on the part of each notto intrude upon what is reserved to the other.  If religion is relegated to private lifeit cannot “be expected to serve as a buffer, to mediate between persons and the state,
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or to compete with the liberal state for our values and loyalties.”   If, at the same time,328the state intrudes upon the role of the church or seeks to influence matters with whichreligion is concerned, it will, as Kuyper charged, “arm unbelief” in a way that does notpromote liberty, substantive neutrality or the vibrancy of religious associations.329Kuyper himself grappled with this during the Dutch school controversy of the latenineteenth century—an issue that was critical in his rise to political prominence andthe establishment of his Anti-Revolutionary Party.  Although the revised Dutch educa-tional law called for the inculcation of “Christian and civic virtues,” the education hadin the Kuyper’s, and many views, lost its distinctly Christian character.   In light of330this, Kuyper believed that the requirement should be removed from the constitutionand the “neutrality” or secularity of Dutch schools be acknowledged.331But, this does not mean that he believed secular public education was within theproper sphere of the state.  To the contrary, he urged the Christian School Society toestablish as its goal to be the wholesale destruction of state-controlled education infavor of parentally guided education.   In 1878, when the Prime Minister proposed332a series of educational reforms that would be funded only in state schools, Kuyper,in conjunction with Catholic leaders, organized opposition.333The notions of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty define not only the realmsof mediating structures, but of the state itself.  To borrow from Professor McGinnis,expansion of the domain of collective decision-making applies to what the governmentsays as well as to what it finances.   If this expansion involves the state with matters334with which alternative spheres are properly concerned, then the state has, in fact,“enter[ed] the arena on the side of one set of religious norms or another.”   It has,335in Professor Horwitz’s terms “weigh[ed] in” on religious questions.336As we have seen, that the state “weigh[s] in” without the use of theological lan-guage or by avoiding solely extratemporal subject matter does not make it otherwise.It neither softens the message of disapproval or can be expected to have no impact on“private” religious formation.  Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, a prominent Kuyper scholar,explained the harm that Kuyper saw in rigorously secularized education.
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[I]n Kuyper’s understanding, a religion, whatever else it may be,incorporat s a certain Weltanschauung.  That worldview will cometo expression in how the community that embraces the particularreligion worships.  But the worldview will also come to expressionin how it wants its children to be educated, in what it thinks thepolicy of the state should be on such matters as welfare, abortion,and international law, in what it thinks about art and business, andso forth.  The right to free exercise of one’s religion is thus farmore comprehensive than the right to worship freely.337
This is echoed in the language of Dignitatis Humanae arguing that religious actstranscend “the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs” and that “[t]he social natureof man . . . itself requires that he should give external expression to his internal acts ofreligion:  that he should share with others on matters religious; that he should professhis religion in community.”   It anticipates the insights of postliberal theology on the338relationship between religion and the larger society.Indeed, looking at asymmetry through the lens of institutions and the value ofthe decentralized generation of norms simply underscores the problematic nature ofasymmetry.  It does not prevent the state from “taking sides” or “weighing in.”  Itmerely ensures that it will do so in a way that is calculated to privilege the secular andthose who, because of the nature of their religious beliefs or a willingness to subor-dinate them to a public secularity, prefer or are content with a naked public square.This marginalizes both the individuals who are unprotected, and the religiousmediating institutions to which they belong.  While it is inevitable that governmentspeech will confer both advantage and disadvantage, an asymmetry that turns on ex-plicitly religious language does so in a way that tilts the playing field.  The “dangerfacing those who disagree with the state’s views,” one scholar has noted, “most often”is “not from any plausible fear of classic censorship—that is, overt punishment foroffering views repugnant to state authorities—but, rather, from being drowned out ofthe marketplace by the often superior resources of the state.”339This “drowning out,” runs in one direction.  As Richard Garnett observes, we havebecome “hard-wired now to think that faith is non-reason” and that “religion is re-garded, even by many of the religious, as an expression of subjective longings, ofautonomous self-expression and direction, and of consumer preferences, rather thanas a response to a set of proposed truth-claims about the meaning of life and the des-tiny of the person.”   The predicate of religious equality is that “religion does not340
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matter, at least not in the public domain.”   Indeed, members of the Court have,341from time to time, treated religious perspectives as irrational.   Once again, Chase342Harper is not told to repudiate his religion, but to keep it in his car with all of thoseother things that are irrelevant to his role as a public citizen.  He may enter the circle,but only on his terms.Perhaps the threat is overstated.  Proponents of more or less strict separation arguethat the United States has remained a religious nation notwithstanding, or perhapseven because of, the separation of church and state.   This is even so, they continue,343in comparison to many Western democracies that have an established church.   This344argument should indeed give pause to those who seek active state promotion of theirreligious viewpoint.It is also the case that the constitutional regime requiring a more rigorous sepa-ration of religion and the state is of relatively recent origin, and corresponds with anera when religious observance in the United States has, in fact, declined.   This does345not mean that constitutional doctrine caused this decline, but it does militate againsta facile assumption that one can empirically demonstrate the way in which that doc-trine has protected religious vibrancy.  Nor does it seem that the association of religiousvibrancy or decline with constitutional doctrine tells us anything about whether it pro-tects religion from the state in a way that nonestablishment was intended to secure.Even if one assumes, for example, a connection between declining religious obser-vance and a more separationist constitutional doctrine, some would certainly arguethat this is the result of the suspension of government support for religion (“eveningthe playing field” for irreligion) than it is of government sponsored secularism (“tiltingthe playing field” in favor of irreligion).But, as we have seen, if constitutional doctrine runs the risk of affecting—ortaking sides regarding—the way in which citizens view religion, it is not so much infavor of godlessness, but of certain assumptions about the relationship between reli-gious belief and life in the larger society.  If one believes the claims of scholars, such
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as Alan Wolfe, religion in America has largely become nondogmatic, tolerant, andinclusive.   Perhaps this is desirable, but, if we believe our rhetoric about neutrality346and nonendorsement, it ought not be facilitated by constitutional doctrine.
D. The Impact of Asymmetry Upon Religion:  A Possible Narrative
Full consideration of the impact of state policy on religion and public secularityis beyond the scope of this article.  By way of example, however, political scientistHugh Heclo traced the twentieth century project, embodied in the Progressive move-ment, to secularize public education and what he called the rise of the “consumptionarts” embodying an implicit philosophy of “meaning . . . constructed by individualsmaking a myriad of wholly self-referential consumer choices,” to include a secularpublic ethos, celebrating tolerance, democracy, and individual choice:347
With “God talk” set out of bounds, the young democrat undergoingsuch an education was invited to identify with America’s seculardemocratic heroes:  Emerson’s “endless seeker,” Thoreau’s indi-vidual moving to the beat of a different drummer, Whitman’ssinger of songs democratic to himself:  “Healthy, free, the worldbefore me / The long brown path before me, leading wherever Ichoose.”  The all but inescapable implication was that to journeytoward self-discovery, one had to leave behind the religion ofchurches, parents, hand-me-down doctrines, and any idea of naturallaw.  Instead the individual is called to enter a liberated conditionof being free to choose among the ideas and practices of any or noreligion without being judged or casting judgments.  Personalfreedom is the ultimate root of moral obligations.348
This move was not always in opposition to organized religion, but interactedwith it.  In Heclo’s view, modern secular liberalism drew on the moral heritage ofthe Judeo-Christian tradition while its message to the churches was “to drop the super-natural baggage.”   Only a few—particularly within the Protestant mainline—were349willing to, if not to drop it, at least to de-emphasize it.Thus, civil society increasingly came to see that “the social ethic of equality, free-dom, and justice was derived from democratic society itself, with one’s religious out-look a purely private appendage”  within the realm of private choice.  This set of350
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cultural assumptions underlies the Court’s early move to strict separation.   We can351see them in the Court’s assumption that religion is “private,”  and what one com-352mentator called our increasing tendency to see religion and rationality as occupyingseparate realms.   As Heclo observed, “[m]ore than ever before, cultural authority353was a politically contested concept by Americans who no longer seemed to share thesame moral universe.”354This problem is accentuated by the second move—that is, the increased involve-ment of the government in matters with which religion is traditionally concerned.But, as Heclo observed, this movement went beyond a mere expansion of govern-ment to the view that “the one thing of supreme importance in politics is governmentpolicy.”   In a trend that he believed characterized both the political left and right,355Heclo noted that “[t]o become more democratic was to become committed to a never-ending policy agenda of social problem-solving.”   This expanding political agenda,356moreover, included issues that went “well beyond the older economic agenda of theNew Deal” to include those that “directly challenged traditional views of the family,women, sexual morality, and the self-validating quality of personal choice.”357In other words, the agenda of public policy expanded at the same time that societyincreasingly ceased to hold the same moral—and religious—presuppositions relatedto that agenda.  These developments are certainly attributable, in a greater or lesserdegree, to social forces other than our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  They mayor may not, in and of themselves, be a good thing.  But the interpretation of neutralityas a rigorous nonendorsement limited to expressly theological propositions, is anythingbut neutral toward them.  It is undoubtedly affected by them even as it contributesto them.
IV. SEEKING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SYMMETRY
Much of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence and theory has reacted tothe changed role of the contemporary state by expanding the reach of disestablishmentas the government’s role has grown.  To believe that the modest governments of thelate eighteenth century ought not to establish churches or prescribe religious doctrinedoes not necessarily imply that, if government chooses to involve itself in education
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or social welfare, all religious messages must be excluded.  But there is no logicalneed to do so.  The expansion of the modern state reflected a change in notionsregarding not just the size but the scope of government.  Coming to see disestablish-ment as a guarantee of secularized public space or a requirement of a thoroughgoingpublic neutrality is a conceptual choice that is distinct and not necessarily compelledby the idea of disestablishment.  Put another way, the imperative of separation mayhave been necessary and workable as applied to the activities of seventeenth centurygovernment.   It may be neither today.358One potential solution for Establishment Clause asymmetry would be to requirethat the state remain neutral among all points of view rooted in religious belief, or thatit must acknowledge the presence of a religious perspective whenever some citizensfeel that it is pertinent; or (and this may be compelled by that kind of neutrality), itwould simply withdraw from those areas of life with which religion is concerned—that is, those areas that are committed to another sphere.While it may be prudent and wise policy for the state to tread lightly in such areas,such a constitutional mandate would be unworkable and politically impossible.  In areligiously diverse society, it could not be implemented in an evenhanded way withoutseverely truncating the scope of government in a way that is impossible to imaginetoday.  Such is the lesson of Establishment Clause asymmetry.  Nor would it be desir-able.  There are certain perspectives—say those of Christian Dominionists, IslamicJihadists or White Supremacists—that the government ought to discourage.  Is therea better way to accommodate protection of religious dissidents without unduly restrict-ing the expressive functions of government?Again, consideration of the role and importance of mediating institutions may helpus.  If the objective is to ensure that the state “assists” but does not “usurp” mediatingstructures and that it not become Kuyper’s “octopus,” then it may be that the questionof establishment is about whether the state is acting to facilitate religious liberty in thebroader sense suggested by the need for vigorous religious communities.  The focuswould turn from a rigid jurisdictional examination (for example:  has governmentdone something “religious”) to a more consequentialist inquiry.  In other words, giventhe scope of the government’s activities, has its efforts to acknowledge the religiouslife of its citizens or to express messages pertinent to religious choices unduly inter-fered with individual liberty and the proper sphere of religious institutions?
A. “No Establishment” Means . . . No Establishment
Father Thomas Curry has argued that eighteenth century establishment was under-stood to refer to a church which the government funded and controlled and in which
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government used its coercive power to encourage participation.   Professor Gedicks359has made the same point:  a classic eighteenth century establishment was a statechurch supported by taxation and, to which, perhaps allegiance was either requiredor rewarded with concrete privileges.   But what does it mean to institutionally sepa-360rate church and state, particularly in an era where neither the government, nor thechurch may look much like they did in the eighteenth century?“No establishment,” however, presumes that at least some religion will expressitself in institutional structures.  Thus, the government ought not to be in the businessof running churches.  It ought not, in the words of Lemon, become excessively entan-gled in the operation of religious institutions.   It may not proclaim that Christianity361is the official religion of the United States.  It ought not to directly fund churches,discipline or regulate clergy, prescribe ecclesiastical rules, etc.  All of this would beprohibited under current Establishment Clause doctrine.But how far do these restrictions go?  Kyle Duncan has argued, through the lensof subsidiarity, that “state authority and a religious association should never coalesceinto an identical, entirely overlapping entity.”   The reason, seen in terms of intermedi-362ating institutions, is that such a coalescence will impair or even absorb the function ofalternative spheres.   In terms of a substantive neutrality rooted in a concern for indi-363vidual religious freedom, it will have crossed the hazy line separating acknowledgmentfrom prescription.I am afraid that there is no easy way to determine when that line has been crossed.We have already seen that the modern state does many things to which religious per-spectives are pertinent and which may have a significant impact upon religious beliefsand the political and social status of believers.  One way to define establishment mightbe to require a presumption that government actions have a “secular” or, perhaps moreaccurately, a “temporal” purpose.  Government actions, in the words of Daniel Conkle,generally ought to have a “worldly” purpose:  whatever its religious motivation orgrounding, its actions are concerned with “non-spiritual human behavior in the phys-ical world.”   In other words, even when engaging in religious expression, it ought364to be motivated by the desire to accomplish a secular or temporal result:  somethingother than a desire to define religious doctrine or to engage in advocacy on mattersthat are wholly theological or spiritual.365
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individual choice or the state’s maintenance of open forum. Although some argue that the sinequa non of disestablishment is the prohibition of the direct or indirect allocation of tax dollarsfor religious purposes, this, too, cannot survive the expansion of government. It is difficultto see how an agnostic is any more aggrieved by funding a nondenominational prayer, than anevangelical might be by the knowledge that her tax dollars are used to fund thoroughly secularapproaches to areas of life in which she believes that faith is indispensable. If liberty of con-science is threatened by requiring one to fund proselytizing for a God that does not exist, thenwhy is it not similarly threatened by diverting tax funds to promote, or at least model, thenotion that a comprehensive life view, or attention to life’s most difficult questions, can andare routinely answered without a God who one believes to be sovereign?BOLT, supra note 330, at 343 (citing ABRAHAM  KUYPER, ONS PROGRAM 2, 71 (J.H.366Kruyt 1880)).Id. at 343–44. This, too, is implied by a view of society in which the alternative spheres367cooperate in tension and in which, as postliberal theologians and sociologists of religion tellus, what happens in the “secular” world is inextricably bound with what happens in the“religious” world.Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also368Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 573, 640 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that wasa hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy andof financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”).JEREM Y WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981–1991, 36–37 (1993).369 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673 (1989) (“[I]t borders on sophistry to370suggest that the ‘reasonable’ atheist would not feel less than a ‘full membe[r] of the politicalcommunity’ every time his fellow Americans recited, as part of their expression of patriotismand love for country, a phrase he believed to be false.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part anddissenting in part).Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1948) (Jackson, J., concur-371ring) (doubting the Constitution can be construed “to protect one from the embarrassment thatalways attends nonconformity, whether in religion, politics, behavior or dress”).
This may be a useful guidepost, but it cannot function as a “test.”  There may beoccasions where acknowledgment of belief—without more—ought to be permitted.There are times when government acts to acknowledge the history and culture of itscitizens.  Kuyper’s Anti-Revolutionary Party, for example, called for state recognitionand facilitation of the Lord’s Day,  and Kuyper himself reportedly expressed admi-366ration for the fact that Americans opened sessions of Congress and military campaignswith prayer.   This alone may not help us decide many difficult twenty-first century367cases, but there are at least two other principles that may provide further guidance.
B. No Establishment Means No Coercion
Concurring in Van Orden, Justice Thomas argued that establishment requires“actual legal coercion.”   While coercion may not always be necessary, it should368certainly be sufficient.But coercion must be properly understood.  We cannot make “the social world . . .acceptable to every last individual.”   Justice Kennedy  (and Justice Jackson be-369 370fore him)  observed that the Constitution was not intended to and cannot protect371
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See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, Essay, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion,37283 OR. L. REV. 1, 36 (2004) (“By advocating what has occasionally been termed a ‘religionof secularism,’ defenders of the religious minority aim to transform the public square intoone in which dissent is no longer required.”) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C.373DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1639–43 (2006) (noting that coercion involves a forced choice, the threatof sanction and coercive intent).Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 87 (1981).374 Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. RICH.375L. REV. 1195, 1219 (2008).Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060–61 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.376denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).A different case might be present if a dissenter was forced to stand.377
minorities from feeling like, well, minorities.   Coercion must involve the threat372of a sanction.   As Jeffrie Murphy has written, “[t]rue duress [coercion], to put it373crudely, requires not merely an unhappy choice but a villain who is responsible forcreating the necessity of making that choice.”   While coercion can certainly result374from psychological or social sanction—“pressure that no one could reasonablyresist” —it is also the case that psychological pressure may simply reflect the way375things are—the “breaks” to use the vernacular.  Distinguishing the two necessarilyinvolves a decision about the way things should be, a theory as to which pressures areand are not legitimate.As we have seen, it is impossible to prevent all instances in which, as a resultof some state action, a person faces social pressure to remain polite and respectfulwhen her religious beliefs require her to do otherwise.  To regard the mere exposureto religious assertions, such as nondenominational prayer at graduation ceremonies,as “coercive” is to make a judgment that exposure to such prayer as a condition ofattendance is unreasonable.  It reflects a judgment that even very subtle pressure toact in a way—or to appear to affirm something—that is contrary to one’s religiouspresuppositions is illegitimate.But, again, this is a principle that we cannot live by.  In Mozert, as a condition ofattendance, plaintiffs believed that to require their children to listen quietly to a teacherreading material that they regard as blasphemous violated religious duty.   There are376those for whom standing during prayer is an affirmation of, or participation in, theprayer.  But there is little reason to regard the sensibilities of the latter as different inkind from those of the former.  One who stands respectfully or sits quietly during aprayer—or even during discourse that contradicts her religious beliefs—is simplystanding respectfully or sitting quietly.377Even if the state can reasonably be seen as endorsing particular religious senti-ments through the sponsoring of the graduation prayer, it hardly follows that it is pass-ing judgment on nonadherents.  I teach at a Catholic law school which opens mostmajor school events with (generally nondenominational) prayer—the content of which
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I acknowledge that our students knew we are a Jesuit school when they decided to come378to Marquette, but it is not evident that our student body is any less diverse or that ourstudents are “hardier” when faced with challenges to their predispositions.James R. Beattie, Jr., Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty Seriously: Shifting Our379Notion of Toleration from Locke to Mill, 43 CATH. LAW. 367, 402 (2004).WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 68–69 (2005).380 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise381of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1516 (1990).
it presumably unambiguously endorses (for example, there is a God and She cares forlawyers).  There are crucifixes on our walls, yet our diverse student body prospers.378Certainly the imposition of penalties or legal disabilities upon nonadherentswould amount to impermissible coercion.  In such cases, as James Beattie writes, the“government is sending a sheriff, not a message.”   But for psychological pressure379to constitute coercion, it must amount to something more than a reminder that one isa religious minority and that others in the community have other beliefs.  It must con-stitute more than a perception that the government has “endorsed” or “acknowledged”beliefs that one does not share.
C. Nonestablishment Means Religious Tolerance
This is not to suggest that institutional establishment or coercion is the only wayin which the government can run afoul of the Establishment Clause.  Disestablish-ment prohibits more than theocracy and inquisition.  William Galston has defined“expressive liberty” as “[t]he ability of individuals and groups to live in ways con-sistent with their understanding of what gives meaning and purpose to life . . . .”380Nonestablishment ought to require that government refrain from placing undue pres-sure on the expressive liberty of religious dissenters and their ability to pursue theirown beliefs and practices.  In terms of intermediary institutions, the question becomesone of whether the state has used its power in a way that threatens to unduly impede,displace or corrupt the sphere of the church.For cases that do not amount to classic establishments or legal coercion, the focusof the inquiry should shift from a series of binary questions—“does the governmenthave an improper purpose?” or, “can a government message or practice be reasonablyperceived as an endorsement of religion or as advancing or inhibiting religion?”—toa qualitative one assessing the burden placed on nonadherents.The question ought to be whether government practices or messages with respectto religion are sufficiently hostile toward those burdened by the practice or messagesuch that continued adherence to their beliefs (or lack of belief) would become unrea-sonably difficult.  Government action becomes “practically coercive” when it createsa substantial threat to religious pluralism or of suppressing religious differences.381This is a form of “substantive neutrality,” but a more modest form.  It seeks only
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Esenberg, supra note 11, at 64–66.382 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are383We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAM E L. REV. 837, 838 (2009).See id.384 485 U.S. 439 (1988).385 Id. at 449.386
rough justice.  While this test is necessarily subjective, there are some guiding prin-ciples that we may discern.382As is the case today, government may take a position on secular matters that areinconsistent with those based in the religious views of some citizens.  But these posi-tions ought not to be rendered constitutionally problematic simply because the stateacknowledges their religious provenance or uses religious language.  Nor shouldthese messages be free of scrutiny simply because they avoid religious language orextratemporal assertions.   These positions become constitutionally problematic,383not simply when they are mixed with theological propositions, but when they can bereasonably interpreted as reading the religious group out of the political communityor usurping the role of religious institutions.In contrast to current doctrine, this model would not presume that the mereendorsement of a religious proposition renders nonadherents disfavored members ofthe citizens, but asks whether the particular endorsement actually does so.  While I canthink of no simple test for determining when this has happened, one relevant questionmight be whether a message with religious implications claims that adherents are notgood citizens or are proper objects of public derision or ostracism.  While the extentto which a government message includes theological assertions or claims of exclu-sivity are certainly relevant to this inquiry, they are not controlling.Under the model proposed here, courts may not dispose of establishment claimsby assuming that almost all religious claims and virtually no secular claims cause con-stitutional injury.  Courts have been reluctant to probe deeply into religious claims,often adhering to what has been referred to as the “no religious decisions” rule.  Indeed,the regime of Smith can be seen as driven by that reluctance.  But this aversion to theassessment of religious claims has not been as absolute as claimed, and courts are notunfamiliar with assessing the magnitude of the claimed injury.   In the free exercise384context (at least before Smith) and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, theyhave often assessed whether a government action constitutes a substantial burden onfree exercise.  In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,  for385example, the Supreme Court rejected a free exercise challenge to the construction ofa logging road through an area of the Six Rivers National Forest regarded to be sacredby several Indian tribes.  The Court rejected the claim, noting that they were not“coerced by the Government’s action into violating their religious beliefs”nor did the“governmental action penalize religious activity by denying [the plaintiffs] an equalshare of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”386
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535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).387 Id. at 1062–63.388 Id. at 1063.389
In Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service,  the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,387rejected an RFRA challenge to a plan to create artificial snow on a mountain re-garded to be sacred by a number of tribes.  Either in and of itself or by virtue of thepresence of a small amount of human waste in the water to be used, the tribes arguedthat the plan would impair their religious practices.   Noting that the tribes retained388access to the mountain for worship, the majority concluded that injury to the tribes’“subjective spiritual experience” is not a sufficiently “substantial burden” on theirreligious practices under the RFRA.389Although I may not agree that constitutionally cognizable religious injury mustinvolve “coercion” or “penalty” and cannot be “merely” subjective, characterizing aclaim in this way does require a court to evaluate its nature.  While there is much moreto be said, assessment—not of the truth of the claim—but of the nature and extent ofthe injury said to flow from it is not beyond judicial competence.
CONCLUSION
We come to our Establishment Clause asymmetry honestly.  There are, indeed,dangers from an overly close association of church and state.  But as the state expands,those dangers are not avoided by a jurisprudence that turns on the facial secularityof state messages.  Doctrine that seeks to protect both religion and irreligion fromsubtle expressive harm is unworkable and will inevitably be compromised.  Our owncompromises have tilted the playing field in favor of the secular state and against thesocial and cultural relevance of religious institutions.  A new paradigm is in order.
